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EDITOR’S NOTE

W

e begin this issue with remarks given by Roger Warren on the
need to tie preservation of judicial independence with a healthy
dose of judicial accountability. Warren is a former judge and the
former president of the National Center for State Courts. He argues that we
focus on the things we can control, not those we don’t. He urges us to take a
leadership role in getting our own house in order and in making sure we’re
accountable to the public both for our use of funds and for our fidelity to fairness.
Roger Warren’s themes tie in with a new publication from the Justice at
Stake organization mentioned in the Resource Page (page 44). This is no
coincidence: Warren was recently named the
chair of Justice at Stake’s board of directors.
We also encourage you to go online to read
this new, 22-page publication (“Speak to
American Values: A Handbook for Winning
the Debate for Fair and Impartial Courts”),
which is summarized, with a link to the web,
on the Resource Page. Combined with
Warren’s article, this new publication serves as
a roadmap for keeping our courts strong and
for enhancing public support for them.
In our second article, researchers Max
Rothman and Burton Dunlop explore ways in
which the aging of the population is affecting the courts. Through surveys
and court site visits, they describe ways in which the courts are being made
more accessible to older users. Our third article reviews the establishment
of at least 63 specialized courts handling cases involving drivers under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. Gene Flango of the National Center for State
Courts provides a helpful listing of these courts and their early experiences.
Our final article is Professor Charles Whitebread’s annual review of the criminal decisions of the past Term of the United States Supreme Court. His
review of the civil decisions of the past Term will be in the next issue.
I’m pleased to announce that three law students at the University of Kansas
and University of Missouri–Kansas City law schools have agreed to be student
editors for this volume of Court Review. We are once again behind in our publication schedule, but will be able to get caught up with their help. You will
not miss any issues and, during the next 12 calendar months, will receive
more than the usual four. As always, if you have suggestions for authors or
article topics that would be good for Court Review, or if you would like to
speak to other judges through a letter to the editor, please contact me at
sleben@ix.netcom.com.—SL
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President’s Column
Michael Cicconetti

The first 90 days of my term as president of the American

Steve Leben, AJA’s president-elect, and I recently met with

Judges Association have had me criss-crossing this country to

National Center president Mary McQueen and members of her

attend various judicial and court-related conferences. Family,

staff at the National Center in Williamsburg, Virginia. What

friends, and colleagues constantly pester me on my fortunes as

began as a get-acquainted visit quickly turned into a valuable

a frequent traveler. However, the reality of traveling is rushing

brainstorming session on our need to select an issue or topic of

to the airport, long and nervous waits in security lines, subject-

interest to all our members. It must be a topic that our mem-

ing one’s self to nonconsensual search and seizure, capacity-

bers can support, without controversy and with enthusiasm,

filled airplanes with cramped seats, awful microwaved ham-

that will invigorate our officers, Board of Governors, Delegates,

burgers, delayed flights, irritable taxi drivers, foreign-speaking

and members. Steve and I are fine-tuning an idea for presenta-

intern reservation clerks at the hotel, mini-bars, and “Save the

tion to our Executive Committee and, with their approval, we

World” notes about reusing your linens and towels. Oh yes, the

will disseminate it to all our members. In addition to that topic,

glamour of travel! The fun continues with the

our January Executive Committee meeting dis-

silent ride in the hotel elevator, or until that

cussions will include sponsorships and fundrais-

silence is broken by the joker who quips, “I hope

ing, membership surveys, White Paper topics,

this is the express car!” and then, to make the

membership issues, and our involvement with

elevator travel faster,

“Justice at Stake” and its projects (see page 44).

proceeds to push the

already lighted floor button.

In addition to determining a focal issue, I

Upon entering your room you unpack and

firmly believe monetary sponsorships are para-

soon discover the answer to your own question,

mount to the success of AJA. If there is one les-

“What did I forget this time?” After freshening

son I have learned from traveling to various con-

up you take your laptop and attempt to find a wireless connec-

ferences, it is recognizing the necessity of raising money

tion somewhere in the hotel to avoid paying the convenient

through the American Judges Foundation to underwrite the

$9.95 per day hookup in your room. It is always a joy to find

cost of our educational and conference expenditures.

30 new email messages that have arrived, and require a

Sponsorships from vendors, law firms, corporations, and other

response, between departure from home and arrival at the hotel.

foundations will allow us to budget our dues money for mem-

Answer the emails, return phone calls, check-in with the family,

bership promotions and not to cover conference costs.

and head to the conference registration desk. You receive your

Our annual conference attendance has been steadily declin-

materials and your name tag and officially begin the duties as

ing, resulting in budgetary losses. We must stop the financial

AJA Ambassador. Finally, one finds enjoyment by meeting old

bleeding. Obtaining outside income is the only real answer. I

friends, new acquaintances, and colleagues. It becomes a time

will be asking the Executive Committee for suggestions as to the

of sharing experiences, listening to new ideas, and giving thanks

method. Do we ask our AJF members to campaign for spon-

for being a part of the legal profession.

sorships or do we look to an outside professional fundraiser?

Our organization, the American Judges Association, held a

One way or another, it is time to stop talking about this issue at

working lunch visionary session at our annual conference in

our semi-annual meetings and begin a more aggressive

Anchorage, Alaska. In cooperation with the National Center for

approach to fundraising.

State Courts, we spent the better part of a day attempting to find

I, along with the other officers, am looking forward to a pro-

The Executive

ductive and meaningful Executive Committee meeting. If any

Committee will review and discuss the results of this session at

members have any thoughts ideas for the betterment of the

our meeting in mid-January.

association, please contact me as soon as possible.

a focus for the future of our organization.
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Judicial Accountability,
Fairness, and Independence
Roger K. Warren

Editor’s Note: Roger Warren, former California trial judge and
president of the National Center for State Courts, presented the
Justice Robert H. Jackson Lecture at the National Judicial College
on July 21, 2005. We reprint his remarks here.

M

uch attention has focused of late on unfair attacks on
judges leveled in nominal pursuit of greater judicial
accountability. In response to the refusal of the federal courts to intervene in the Terry Schiavo case, for example,
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay angrily declared that
Congress has for many years “shirked its responsibility to hold
the judiciary accountable.”
“No longer,” the leader said. “We will look at an arrogant,
out of control, unaccountable judiciary that thumbed their
nose at the Congress and President when given jurisdiction to
hear this case anew. . . . The time will come for the men
responsible for this to answer for their behavior.”1
A week later Senator John Cornyn, commenting on
Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy’s recent majority
opinion holding unconstitutional the death penalty for juvenile offenders, speculated that recent courthouse violence
might be due to public frustration with decisions of judges
who “are unaccountable to the public.” 2 Others called for
Justice Kennedy’s impeachment.3 Not to be outdone in the
pursuit of judicial accountability, author Edwin Vieira said his
“bottom line” for dealing with such errant judges came from
Joseph Stalin: “He had a slogan and it worked very well for him
whenever he ran into difficulty,” Vieira declared: “‘No man, no
problem.’”4
Much recent attention has also focused on expanded efforts
to achieve judicial accountability of elected state judiciaries
through the ballot box. In 2004, for example, state supreme
court incumbents faced opposition in 18 of the 20 states with
contested elections on the ballot. Supreme court campaigns
attracted network television ads in four times as many states as

Footnotes
1. See Mike Allen, DeLay Wants Panel to Review Role of Courts;
Democrats Criticize His Attack on Judges, WASH. POST, April 2,
2005, at A9; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Republican Lawmakers Fire Back
at Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at A10.
2. See Charles Babington, Senator Links Violence to “Political”
Decisions; “Unaccountable” Judiciary Raises Ire, WASH. POST, April
5, 2005, at A7.
3. See Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty,
WASH. POST, April 9, 2005, at A3.
4. See id.
5. The 2004 judicial-election information is detailed in D EBORAH
GOLDBERG, SARAH SAMIS, EDWIN BENDER, & RACHEL WEISS, THE
NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004 (2005) (Jesse Rutledge,
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in 2000, at over two-and-a-half times the cost. The number of
attack ads nearly doubled. Special-interest groups and political
parties provided over three quarters of the candidate funding,
and covered almost 90% of the costs of the attack ads. The
average cost of a successful campaign increased by 45% to over
$650,000. A 2004 national survey found that 71% of
Americans believed that judicial campaign contributions from
special-interest groups affect judges’ decisions in the courtroom.5
Efforts such as these to achieve judicial accountability in
ways that unnecessarily or unduly interfere with the independence of the judiciary are inappropriate. Unfair personal
attacks on judges, and electoral campaigns by special-interest
groups to unseat judges with whose judicial decisions they disagree, unduly interfere with judicial independence and are
inappropriate means of securing judicial accountability.
Indeed, the comments of DeLay and Cornyn brought immediate rebuke as improper interference with judicial independence. Vice President Richard B. Cheney called DeLay’s comments “inappropriate.” Cheney added, “There’s a reason why
judges get lifetime appointments”6
President George W. Bush declared “I believe in an independent judiciary.”7 The Washington Post editorialized that
“this country has an independent judiciary precisely to shield
judges who make difficult decisions under intense political
and time pressure from the bullying of politicians.”8 DeLay
apologized.9
The National Center for State Courts, the American Bar
Association, the Justice at Stake Campaign, and other organizations now lead national efforts to reduce the threat to judicial independence that arises out of the use of campaign attack
ads, undue electoral influence of special-interest groups and
political parties, and other harmful judicial-election campaign
practices.
There are many threats to judicial independence. Roscoe
Pound observed 100 years ago that “dissatisfaction with the

6.
7.

8.
9.

ed.), available on the web at http://www.followthemoney.org/
press/Reports/200506271.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
Mike Allen & Brian Faler, Cheney Opposes Retribution Against
Schiavo Judges, WASH. POST, April 4, 2005, at A4.
Nina J. Easton, Rift Emerges in GOP After Schiavo Case, BOSTON
GLOBE, April 9, 2005, available on the web at http://www.
boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/04/09/rift_em
erges_in_gop_after_schiavo_case?mode=PF (last visited Nov. 20,
2005).
Beyond the Pale, WASH. POST, April 17, 2005, at B6.
Mike Allen, DeLay Apologizes for Comments; Leader Wouldn’t Say
Whether He Wants Schiavo Judges Impeached, WASH. POST, April 14,
2005, at A5.

administration of justice is as old as law.” And, clearly, there is
no easier way to strike a harmonious chord with an audience
of judges than to decry the increasing number of unfair personal attacks on the judiciary. Yet, many sources of dissatisfaction and threats to judicial independence are beyond our control. Unfair attacks on appointed and elected judges typically
emanate from controversial judicial decisions involving issues
affecting powerful special interests—or about which segments
of the public hold intense or evangelical views. Justice
Jackson, to whose memory this lecture series is dedicated,
spoke himself of this phenomenon over a half century ago.
“[W]e must not forget,” he observed, “that in our country are
evangelists and zealots of many different political, economic,
and religious persuasions whose fanatical conviction is that all
thought is divinely classified into two kinds—that which is
their own and that which is false and dangerous.”10 Despite the
best efforts of judges to effectively explain and communicate
their decisions, public expression of dissatisfaction with judicial decisions—and unfair attacks on judges—are inevitable.
As Pogo reminds us, however, oftentimes “we have met the
enemy and it is us.” Oftentimes, we as judicial officers allow
threats that originate outside the judiciary to distract us from
proper focus on the much more dangerous threats that result
from our own unsatisfactory performance. We become preoccupied with the external threats to judicial independence
over which we have little control rather than fully accepting
accountability for our own performance—over which we have
almost complete control. We must examine our own performance honestly—and demonstrate the courage and ability to
improve our performance when it is found insufficient.
Judicial independence concerns the judiciary’s freedom
from improper control, influence, or interference in the decision of cases—and in the governance and management of the
judiciary’s affairs. Sometimes we forget that judicial independence is not an end in itself but merely a means to an end.
With respect to judicial decision making, the object of judicial
independence is to ensure judicial fairness—that judicial decisions are based solely on evidence and law and not influenced
by any improper consideration. With respect to judicial decision making, judicial independence is the freedom to be fair.
Judicial accountability refers to the accountability under
democratic government of those who govern to those whom
they govern—as well as to the rule of law. Unfortunately,
unfair attacks on the courts—and other inappropriate acts
undertaken in the name of judicial accountability—have
tended to give the concept of judicial accountability itself a bad
name. But unlike the concept of judicial independence,
accountability is an end in itself and applies to all three
branches of government. The judiciary is not exempt from the
requirement of accountability to the people it serves for the
proper performance of its duties.
When we as judges speak of judicial independence as if it
is an end in itself, or as if it is unlimited, or intended merely

for our own personal benefit
Judicial
as judges rather than for the
benefit of litigants, we risk independence does
creating the impression that
not excuse the
we regard ourselves as being
courts from
above the law, or less
compliance
with
accountable for our perf o rmance than other governappropriate
mental officials are for
standards of
theirs. The judiciary is after
accountability: it
all a co-equal branch of gove rnment, neither lesser nor merely helps define
superior to any other.
the standards . . .
Judicial independence does
that are
not excuse the courts fro m
appropriate.
compliance with appro p r iate standards of accountability: it merely helps define the standards of accountability
that are appropriate.
How shall we be judged? By what standards should the
courts be held accountable? It is critical that the courts themselves define and communicate the standards by which their
performance may properly be judged. Unless and until we do
so, we will continue to be judged by standards, oftentimes
inappropriate, fashioned by others. We must define and communicate not only what the public does not have a right to
expect from the courts, but also what the public and other
branches do have the right to expect.
The public does not have the right to expect, for example,
that judicial decisions will invariably be popular or always to
its satisfaction. Cases must be decided based on facts and law,
not public appeal. For the legal correctness of their decisions,
courts are accountable neither to the other branches of government nor to the electorate—but to principles of law as
interpreted by higher courts.
The public does have the right to expect, however, that
courts will be run efficiently and in a professional manner, and
that every person will be treated fairly and equally. The public
also has the right to expect that judges will be competent,
knowledgeable about the law, and willing and able to behave in
accord with the highest ethical standards.
Many courts have adopted either trial or appellate court
performance standards by which court performance may properly be measured. The National Center for State Courts has
recently formulated ten basic statistical measures of court performance.11 Formal criteria for evaluation of judges exist in
many states using merit selection or retention processes. The
ultimate standard to which judges and courts should be held
accountable, however—and the real test of judicial performance—is whether courts serve to the general satisfaction of
the litigants and public whom they serve. The courts are also
dependent on public trust and confidence to obtain the public
resources and inter-branch cooperation that are indispensable

10. American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 438
(1950) (Jackson, J., concurring and dissenting).
11. These measures, called CourTools, are available at http://

www.courtools.org. An overview can be found on the Resource
Page of this issue of Court Review at page 44.
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to a functioning judiciary.
Over the last five years,
the National Center for
State Courts has conducted
a number of state and
national public opinion
surveys to identify the factors that most directly
affect public confidence in
the courts.12 Although surprising to many, the survey
findings consistently identify the direction in which courts must proceed to build greater
public trust.
First, the extent of public confidence in the courts
depends substantially more on the respondents’ perc e p t i o n s
of the extent of judicial fairness than on any other aspect of
c o u rt perf o rmance or demographic factor. Whereas attorneys’ (and judges’) views of court performance depend more
on their perceptions of the fairness of court outcomes (in
contrast to the fairness of court pro c e d u re), the views of litigants and members of the public are influenced almost
twice as much by their views of the fairness of court pro c edure than by their views of the fairness of court outcomes.
What do we mean by the fairness of court procedure? The
most recent survey used four procedural characteristics to
define the concept of procedural fairness: whether the courts
(1) are unbiased; (2) treat people with respect; (3) listen carefully to what people have to say; and (4) are trustworthy, i.e.,
care about the people before them and take their individual
needs into account. The single factor that most greatly influences respondents’ perceptions of the extent of procedural fairness is their perception of whether judges are honest and fair.
Second, although those with prior jury service experience
hold more favorable views than others of the fairness of court
processes, those with direct prior experience as litigants hold
less favorable views of the courts’ procedural fairness. The
types of cases in which respondents are most critical of procedural fairness are the high-volume cases in which ordinary citizens and unrepresented litigants most frequently appear: traffic, family, and small-claims cases.
Third, whereas two-thirds or more of white, Hispanic, and
Asian-Americans believe that the courts are procedurally fair, a
majority of African-Americans do not. Moreover, a majority of
all respondents believe that African-Americans and HispanicAmericans usually receive less favorable results in court than
others, and about two-thirds believe that low-income people
and non-English speakers receive less favorable results.

Fourth, the single area of court responsibility in which respondents’ expectations of court performance are most frequently
unmet is the expectation that the court should “report to the
public on its job performance,” i . e ., judicial accountability.
If the courts are to reinforce and improve their standing
with the public, judges need to critically self-examine the fairness of their interactions, as well as the interactions of court
staff, with those who use our courts, including in traffic, family, and small-claims cases. They must also redouble their
efforts to address widespread perceptions of unequal treatment
in the justice system—for the poor, non-English speaking, and
minorities. Finally, the courts must more clearly acknowledge
their accountability to the public they serve and find more and
better ways to report on their performance to the public.
In the long run, legitimate criticism of the judiciary, left
unaddressed, is a far greater threat to the independence of the
judiciary than unfounded attacks. And understandably so.
Democracy is a system of checks and balances. How can the
judiciary expect the public or other branches of government to
defer to the independence of the judiciary if the judiciary cannot demonstrate its own ability to do a good job—and properly
manage its own affairs? As one commentator has noted, “Part
of being master of your own home is keeping your house in
order.”13 In effect, our system of checks and balances strikes a
bargain with the judiciary. In consideration for the judiciary’s
relative independence, the public and other branches of government expect that we will do our job well and keep our
house in order. If we cannot, or do not, do that, we are not in
any credible position to complain about the inevitable intrusions on our independence that result.
Among the various sources of legitimate criticism, the greatest threat to judicial independence is the perception that courts
do not treat people fairly and equally. The surveys show that
these perceptions affect public confidence in the judiciary
more than any other factor. Judicial fairness and equal justice
under law are fundamental expectations of the American justice system—and of judges in particular. Unfair and unequal
treatment are perceived by litigants and the public not as incidents of technical incompetence but as fundamental defects of
judicial character. Lay members of the public may not believe
that they have sufficient qualifications or experience to evaluate judicial competence—or determine whether judges have
correctly decided the law—but they surely do believe that they
are able to judge our character, our honesty and our fairness,
and decide whether we are worthy of their trust.
Yes, we in the judiciary must seek to protect American
courts from unfair attacks leveled in the name of judicial
accountability and from other inappropriate external interfer-

12. The most recent survey was in California: DAVID B. ROTTMAN, PART
1: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE
CALIFORNIA COURTS: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS
(Judicial Council of California/Administrative Office of the
Courts, 2005).
13. G. Alan Tarr, Director, Center for State Constitutional Studies,
Rutgers University-Camden, speaking at the American Judicature
Society Mid-Year meeting on Febru a ry 28, 2004, in Panel
Discussion, “The Courts, the Legislature, and the Executive:

Separate and Equal?” JUDICATURE 230, 239 (March-April 2004).
14. Call to Action: Statement of the National Summit on Improving
Judicial Selection (National Center for State Courts 2001), available on the web at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
Res_JudSel_CallToActionPub.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
Among other things, the Call to Action urged that all judicial elections be nonpartisan, that non-governmental monitoring groups
be established to encourage fair and ethical judicial campaigns,
and that greater information be provided to voters by state and
local governments concerning judicial candidates.

In the long run,
legitimate criticism
of the judiciary, left
unaddressed, is a
far greater threat to
the independence of
the judiciary than
unfounded attacks.
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ence in the independence of courts. For example, we must
continue to implement the recommendations put forth in the
Call to Action issued by participants in the National Summit
on Improving Judicial Selection held December 2000.14 We
must not be distracted, however, from maintaining an even
firmer resolve to address legitimate criticism of our performance in administering justice fairly, equally, and effectively. In
the end, the surest path to true independence is the path of
judicial accountability—wherein the courts define and communicate the standards to which they may properly be held
accountable—and then continuously demonstrate to the satisfaction of the public and other branches of government that
their performance meets those standards. Most critically, the
courts must honestly reexamine whether their day-to-day
processes provide fair and equal treatment to all.
It is we the judges who must lead this charge. If we do,
future external attacks on the judiciary, albeit troubling, will
substantially erode neither public trust in the courts nor the
courts’ continued independence.
In closing, let us be reminded that judicial independence is
only a concept, an ideal. The United States enjoys the strongest
and most independent judiciary in the world, and our federal
and state constitutions contain provisions intended to promote
the independence of our judiciaries. There is nothing in our
laws, however, that guarantees judicial independence. Judicial
independence has to be continually fought for—and won

anew—each day. It is grounded in public respect for the courts
and for the judicial function. Like respect, it cannot be
demanded. It must be earned.

Roger K. Warren served as president from 1996
to 2004 of the National Center for State Courts,
where he led initiatives to promote public trust
and confidence, best practices, civil-justice
reform, and racial and ethnic fairness. His
judicial career began as a municipal judge in
Sacramento, California, where he served for six
years. He then became a judge on the
Sacramento Superior Court, where he served from 1982 to 1996,
including several years as presiding judge of the court or its divisions. A graduate of the University of Chicago Law School,
Warren was named California’s jurist of the year in 1995 by the
California Judicial Council. He presently serves both as a consultant to the National Center for State Courts and as a scholar-inresidence for the California Administrative Office of Courts. In
addition, Warren serves as chair of the board of directors of the
Justice at Stake Campaign, a coalition of state and national
organizations (including the American Judges Association)
committed to maintaining fair, impartial, and independent
courts.
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Judicial Responses
to an Aging America
Max B. Rothman and Burton D. Dunlop

I

n 2000, the authors published a book titled Elders, Crime, and
the Criminal Justice System: Myth, Perceptions, and Reality in
the 21st Century, in which several chapters were devoted to
older adults’ interactions with the court system.1 Those chapters revealed that these interactions could be highly problematic
for elders. In follow-up, this article is based on a project
designed to address the overarching issue of whether and how
judicial systems in the United States ensure that older adults (60
and older) are provided effective access to the courts, including
both civil and criminal jurisdictions.2 In order to accomplish
this goal, courts need to identify and remove barriers within the
judicial system, and develop or enhance linkages between elders
and the courts as well as with health, mental-health, and social
s e rvice systems in their communities. This article examines
recent developments in judicial administration to establish the
context in which this can be achieved. It then analyzes ten specific questions focused on these issues, as well as other areas of
importance identified during the course of project site visits.
Finally, the article proposes steps or elements necessary in the
development of a model plan needed to respond to issues of
aging in the court s .
Two data-collection methods were employed. The first was
a survey of both state trial courts and federal courts addressing
the ten central questions guiding this project. The survey of
state trial courts was carried out electronically in three steps.
First, the survey was sent to the National Center for State
Courts, which agreed to convey the survey form to all 50 state
court administrators, who in turn were requested to send the
form electronically to all trial-court chief judges or court
administrators within their respective states. It is very likely
that all 50 states received the communication, but it seems
clear that a majority neglected to or decided against sending it
on to the trial courts. We received responses from one or more
courts in only 13 states. A total of 30 completed forms were
returned electronically and three were returned by mail or fax,
for a total of 33 forms. Following negotiations with the Federal
Administrative Office of the Courts to follow a similar
approach with federal district courts, that office declined to
participate. After consulting the Judicial Yellow Book3 for
names and addresses of federal judges, we mailed a slightly
modified version of the state survey form to 93 judges.
Seventeen completed forms from 13 separate courts were
returned by mail or fax. However, this survey elicited a poor

response and provided virtually no useful or interesting findings.
Nearly half (15) of the state-trial-court forms were completed
by court administrators and another two were filled out by
deputy administrators. One circuit judge and two probate
judges completed the forms, while the remaining 13 forms were
answered by various court personnel, e.g., probate registers,
directors or managers of human resources or intergovernmental
relations, self-help centers, planning units, or special projects;
one was even completed by a prosecutor. These surveys were
utilized to obtain a general idea of what courts were doing visà-vis older adults but primarily to identify potential courts for
site visits. Three jurisdictions visited, Reno, Nevada, Sarasota,
Florida, and Wilmington, Delaware, were identified from the
survey. Information provided was verified with follow-up telephone calls. Two sites, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, and Tampa,
Florida, did not respond but were known to the research team
due to their proximity; and two jurisdictions, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, and Phoenix, Arizona, were recommended by contacts at the National Institute of Justice and the National Center
for State Courts as sites with promising innovations that either
did or could relate to older adults.
The second data-collection mode consisted of extensive
interviews of judges and other court and court-related personnel in seven different trial courts: Reno, Nevada; Maricopa
County, Arizona; Tampa, Florida; Sarasota, Florida;
Wilmington, Delaware; Bro w a rd County, Florida; and
Hennepin County, Minnesota. Altogether, the research staff
carried out face-to-face interviews with 53 individuals, each
lasting an average of approximately one hour. Interviewees
included 15 judges, nine court administrators or deputy
administrators, seven professionals involved with guardianships, three directors of self-help centers, three persons from
legal services or legal aid, three management information system specialists, and two public defenders. Others included a
court public affairs director, a specialty courts coordinator, a
corrections officer, an Americans with Disabilities Act coordinator, a director of psychological services, an Adult Protective
Services re p resentative, a perf o rmance measure s / o u t c o m e s
expert, a probate coordinator, an Aging Office representative, a
private attorney, and an Elder Justice Center director. Once
these interviews were completed, staff notes were reviewed
c a refully for common themes and especially innovative

Footnotes
1. ELDERS, CRIME, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE S YSTEM: MYTH,
PERCEPTIONS, AND REALITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Max B. Rothman
et al., eds. 2000).
2. The project and a more detailed report on it were funded by the
Borchard Foundation Center on Law and Aging and the Quantum

Foundation. The report is available at http://www.fiu.edu/~coa/
d o w n l o a d s / e l d e r % 2 0 j u s t i c e / B o rc h a rd _ F i n a l _ R e p o rt _ ( 5 - 2 8 04).pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
3. JUDICIAL YELLOW BOOK: WHO’S WHO IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
(2003).
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arrangements for dealing with older-adult issues or other
court-constituent issues with adaptation potential for older
adults. Lessons learned from our ongoing technical assistance
work with the Elder Justice Center in the Thirteenth Judicial
Circuit of Florida (Palm Beach County) also were brought to
bear in the subsequent review and analysis.
I. CHALLENGES OF AMERICA’S AGING SOCIETY

The challenges of an aging society continue to dominate the
attention of policymakers, academics, particularly those in the
sciences and medicine, the popular media, and the public-atlarge. Issues of health and long-term care, drug benefits, re d u ction of mortality and morbidity, social security, employment,
and other economic issues are researched, legislated, and written about with increasing frequency. These matters are of great
popular and political concern. As the nation’s older population
(65 and older) doubles over the next 25 years from 36 million
to 70 million or more, these issues and many others will be
addressed much more intensively because of the impact they
will have not only on older people themselves and their families, but also on the core institutions of American life.
Little is known, however, about the impact older people will
have on one of the three pillars of American government: the
j u d i c i a ry. Although considerable work has been undertaken
concerning specific substantive areas of “elder law,” notably tax
and estate planning, other end-of-life issues, and guardianships,
there has been little effort to examine the implications of aging
in America on judicial administration, access to the courts, and
resolution of the underlying issues that often precipitate court
involvement for older adults. It is important today to understand more about the nature of situations that lead older people
to the courts, how courts respond to them, and what policies
and court administrative actions are needed to prepare for the
future.
Health and Social Status
Although the demographics of aging in America are
impelling judicial systems to accommodate larger numbers of
older adults in the courthouse, it is the special situations of
many elders that present the administrative challenge for court
administrators and judges. Increasingly, older adults represent
diversity of race, ethnicity, language, education, income, and
living arrangements. The physiological, psychological, and
social profiles of older people are becoming more complex.
Greater incidence of disease occurs with increasing age, including dementia, cancer, bone and joint diseases, vision and hearing loss, memory loss, and loss of cognition. Alzheimer’s disease alone, the most common form of dementia, afflicts 10% of
the U.S. population 65 and older and perhaps close to 50% of
those 85 and older.4 Use of prescription medication tends to
increase dramatically. In a broader social context, older adults
experience loss of roles through retirement, widowhood and
bereavement, isolation and loneliness, depression, and substance abuse.
These factors, individually or in endless panoply of combi-
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Likewise, numbers of arrests
and jailing of older people for
domestic violence, assaults, and dru g - related charges are growing. Arrests for other criminal charges, including misdemeanors such as shoplifting or trespassing, also are increasing.
Motor-vehicle violations of all kinds, including criminal
charges and moving infractions, continue to expand. Civil matters arising from landlord-tenant and other property disputes,
contracts, negligence, and a variety of other factual situations,
will ensure that more older people regularly enter the courthouse. Indeed, more elders also will be selected for jury duty,
called as witnesses, seek divorces, or simply look for inform ation or assistance. Moreover, these matters may well involve
persons with dementia, mental illness or substance abuse, or
complex medical conditions.
Health and Social Services
Any one or combination of factors documented above may
represent the underlying cause for an older adult to be thrust
into the courts. Even if not the underlying cause, some of these
conditions may well be present in a given situation and need to
be taken into account by a judge to dispense justice effectively.
For example, the 78-year-old man jailed for battering his
spouse may be in the early stages of dementia. The 82-year-old
sued for foreclosure for failure to pay her taxes may be suffering from depression and lapses in memory. Other older persons
in both civil and criminal courts may have health and socials e rvices needs that challenge the typical judge’s ability to
respond in a meaningful and timely manner.
The policy issue raised by these circumstances is whether
the courts have the capacity for early identification of these
problems as well as the practical ability to mobilize appropriate
s e rvices. It is not unusual that a court may not actually see an
individual until a petition for guardianship is filed, at which
time any service needs simply may be delegated to the guardian.
Unfortunately, many courts experience difficulty in monitoring
guardians’ actions on behalf of their wards. Accountability in
the guardianship process is a major ongoing challenge for these
courts. In fact, the myriad of cases that may reach a given judge
where an assessment and/or services are needed raises an
important question about how judicial districts will plan to
meet this emerging need. Incre a s i n g l y, courts have been experimenting with administrative methods to obtain services for
other specialized populations. These experiences may offer
important lessons.

4. Alzheimer’s Association, An Overview of Alzheimer’s Disease and
Related Dementias (1997).
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II. RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN
JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION

In recent years, a number
of developments in judicial
philosophy and administration have taken place that,
although not specifically
related to issues of older
adults, have considerable relevance to issues affecting them. It is instructive to review these
developments in order to identify emerging trends and best
practices in related areas that may be applicable. Although each
of them has developed somewhat independently, they are all
related by a common thread that seeks to improve access to the
courts, build closer ties to the community, and ensure more
effective use of available services to reduce recidivism. These are
critically important factors in the context of older people and
the courts.
Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Some courts and judges, following the lead of legal scholars,
have adopted the philosophy of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ)
in their adjudicatory roles. The TJ perspective has been
described by its founders as suggesting: “that the law itself can
be seen to function as a kind of therapist or therapeutic agent.
Legal rules, legal procedures and the role of legal actors . . . constitute social forces that like it or not, often produce therapeutic
or antitherapeutic consequences. Therapeutic jurispru d e n c e
proposes that we be sensitive to those consequences, rather than
ignore them, and that we ask whether the law’s antitherapeutic
consequences can be reduced, and its therapeutic consequences
enhanced, without subordinating due process and other justice
values.”5 TJ has been applied primarily in criminal matters, particularly non violent drug or mental-health cases. Interested in
more than criminal cases, we view TJ as a “lens” of underlying
concepts that looks beyond what’s on paper for older adults
engaged with the law. The value of TJ is that it attempts to identify underlying issues and to address them as appropriate within
the court context.
Community problems such as substance abuse, mental illness, and familial breakdown inevitably enter the court room
and judges search for services and treatment to respond to
them.6 Courts sensitive to the importance of their relationships
to their communities have recognized the need to be more relevant to the public and to address “the breakdown of social and
5. LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds.1996).
6. David Rottman & Pamela M Casey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
the Emergence of Problem-Solving Courts, 240 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J.
12 (July 1999).
7. Id. at 13.
8. Id. at 14.
9. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE COURTS (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, eds. 2003).
10. Id.
See also CCJ Resolution 22 (2000), available at
h t t p : / / w w w. c o m m u n i t y j u s t i c e . o rg / c c j _ c o s c a _ re s o l u t i o n . h t m l
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family support networks.” The authors conclude that TJ is
based on the principle that judges seek “the selection of a
therapeutic option—an option that promotes health and does
not conflict with other normative values of the legal system.”7
In addition to the application in a specific case, it “may be practiced at the organizational level of the court by devising new
procedures, information systems, and sentencing options and
by establishing links to social services providers to promote
therapeutic outcomes.”8
In their most recent edited book, David Wexler and Bru c e
Winick, the principal architects of TJ explore its evolution and
the development of problem-solving court s .9 They cite the 2000
resolution of the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of
State Court Administrators in support of problem-solving
courts, acknowledging the importance of these courts and the
principles of TJ they implement. The resolution adopts a series
of agreements to further analyze and promote problem-solving
courts, including:
Encourage, where appropriate, the broad integration
over the next decade of the principles and methods
employed in the problem-solving courts into the
administration of justice to improve court processes
and outcomes while pre s e rving the rule of law, enhancing judicial effectiveness, and meeting the needs and
expectations of litigants, victims and the community.10
It continues by urging development of other types of court s
based on similar principles. The editors then expand on how
court processes affect outcomes and emphasize how specific
tools and TJ principles can be used across the judiciary. Their
analysis provides the essential context for consideration about
how courts should address issues of an aging society.
Problem-Solving Courts
Pamela Casey and David Rottman describe four primary
types of specialized or problem-solving courts: drug courts (the
first was established in Miami, Florida, in 1989), mental-health
courts, domestic-violence courts, and community court s .11
Family courts, which may handle divorce, domestic violence,
guardianship, and end-of-life matters, re p resent another type of
problem-solving court.12 The creation of these courts reflects
the reaction of trial courts to dockets filled with too many repeat
cases (the “revolving door”) in which judges had worked out
solutions that addressed symptoms rather than root causes or
problems underlying repeated court appearances and convictions. In effect, courts have adopted a TJ approach at an organizational level by using its principles as the underlying legal
t h e o ry.13
(last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
11. PAMELA M. CASEY & DAVID B. ROTTMAN, PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS:
MODELS AND TRENDS (2003), available at http://www. ncscon
l i n e . o rg / W C / P u b l i c a t i o n s / C O M M _ P ro S o l P ro b S o l v C t s P u b . p d f
(last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
12. PAMELA M. CASEY & WILLIAM E. HEWITT, COURT RESPONSES TO
INDIVIDUALS IN NEED OF SERVICES: PROMISING COMPONENTS OF
SERVICE COORDINATION STRATEGY FOR COURTS (2001), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_ProSol_CrtResp
onsesPub.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
13. Rottman & Casey, supra note 6.

It is instructive to explore the unifying themes connecting
these courts. According to one judge, “One of the principal
themes . . . is partnership. They all rely on outside agencies—
to provide social services, to monitor offenders, to supervise
community service sentences. How do you make inter-agency
p a rtnership work?”14 Indeed, given considerable variation
among these courts by jurisdiction and types of cases, an analysis of trends underscored the importance of community serv i c e
linkages and “stress a collaborative, multidisciplinary, problemsolving approach to address the underlying issues of individuals
appearing in the court . ”15
More broadly, problem-solving courts share five common elements:16 (1) immediate intervention; (2) normative social adjudication; (3)
hands-on judicial involvement; (4) treatment
programs with clear rules and stru c t u red goals; and (5) team
approach including judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, treatment provider, and correctional staff.
Although these types of courts are primarily used for nonviolent criminal law violations (some community courts are
multijurisdictional), it is their emphasis on early identification
of underlying problems, collaboration with human-serv i c e s
providers, and individualized treatment approaches that warrant further investigation. As noted, the resolution passed by the
Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court
Administrators in 2000 called for “the careful study and evaluation of the principles and methods employed in problem-solving courts and their application to other significant issues facing
state court s . ”17 The challenge is to understand how these principles and experiences of problem-solving courts can be utilized
to improve how all courts address issues involving older people.
Trial Court Performance Standards
Still another relevant event during this same general period
has been the development of the Trial Court Performance
Standards (TCPS). Initiated in 1987 by the Bureau of Justice
Assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice and the National
Center for State Courts, the TCPS were published in 1997. They
emphasize the careful conceptualization and measurement of
specific indicators of input, output, and outcomes, with the ultimate goal of improving the outcome perf o rmance of the courts.
Outcomes are conceptualized as changes in the well-being of
the public and the community served by a court. The five performance areas of TCPS, which encapsulate the purposes or
goals of the courts, are: 1) Access to Justice; 2) Expedition and
Timeliness; 3) Equality, Fairness, and Integrity; 4)
Independence and Accountability; and 5) Public Trust and
Confidence. As of 2000, approximately one-third of state court s
had adopted the TCPS to one degree or another.18
The TCPS are more than simply an internal procedure for
measuring a jurisdiction’s traditional operations. They are par-

14. Judicial Roundtable, Reflections of Problem-Court Justices,
JOURNAL, June 2000, at 11, available at www.courtinnovation.org/
pdf/reflections_psc_justices.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
15. CASEY & ROTTMAN, supra note 11.
16. Rottman & Casey, supra note 6.
17. CASEY & ROTTMAN, supra note 12.
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Problem-solving courts, as described above, are excellent
venues for the application of TCPS because one of their primary
characteristics is their relationship to community providers of
treatment and services.21 Because identification of service needs
and the ability to mobilize resources in response to those needs
is particularly critical in matters involving elders, the experiences of these courts need to be analyzed carefully. Although not
specifically discussed in this context, nine promising components for effective court-based service coordination have been
identified:22
1) Acknowledged court role in service coordination;
2) Judicial and court leadership;
3) Active policy committee of stakeholders;
4) Case-level service coordinators;
5) Centralized access to service network;
6) Active court monitoring of compliance with orders;
7) Routine collection and use of data;
8) Creative use of resources; and
9) Training and education related to service coordination.
It remains to be understood whether and how these components would work in general-jurisdiction trial courts, in both
civil and criminal jurisdictions. It is particularly important to
l e a rn to what extent this experience can improve how court s
respond to the emerging challenges of an aging society.
Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias
During the 1980s and 1990s, the supreme courts of many
states initiated studies of gender, race, and ethnic bias in the
courts. These efforts typically engaged the judiciary, bar associations, court administrators, private attorneys, law-school faculty, researchers, and others in producing detailed analyses of
existing issues and recommendations to address them. Gender
and race are protected classes under the United States
Constitution, and these efforts were motivated by a desire to

18. Ingo Keilitz, Standards and Measures of Court Performance, 4 CRIM.
JUST. 559 (2000).
19. Pamela M. Casey, Court Population in Need of Services: Defining the
Court’s Role, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 157 (1998).
20. Keilitz, supra note 18, at 583.
21. CASEY & HEWITT, supra note 12.
22. Id.
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ensure that the judiciary itself
was administered fairly and
equitably consistent with prevailing local standards and
sound public policy.23 In
many states, these eff o rts produced exhaustive reports that
examined specific areas of
concern in great detail and led
to ongoing efforts to educate
judges, administrators, attorneys, and others about problem areas and standards of appropriate conduct.
Although age has not been determined to be a protected
class, the demographics of aging ensure nonetheless that court s
must address similar issues in the years ahead. For example, a
Massachusetts report defined gender bias as existing “when
decisions made or actions taken are based on preconceived or
stereotypical notions about the nature, role, or capacity of men
and women.”24 A Pennsylvania report was not as specific but
similarly studied whether individuals were “treated” differently
as “a part y, witness, litigant, lawyer, court employee, or potential juror based on racial, ethnic, or gender bias.”25
It is instructive that these studies examine everything fro m
j u ry selection, court-employment practices, and courthouse
interactions, to domestic-violence process, criminal justice and
sentencing disparities, family-law decisions, and civil damage
awards. Recommendations are made to the judiciary, legislature, bar associations, law schools, and others as appropriate,
together with specific avenues for further research and education. The courts have made significant pro g ress in identifying
problem areas and in producing vigorous efforts to rectify them.
Age is the next frontier.

“Elder Justice
Centers” represent
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FLORIDA ELDER JUSTICE CENTERS

“Elder Justice Centers” (EJCs) represent one model for judicial response to the complex issues presented when elders
interact with the courts. This problem-solving type model has
been developing in two judicial districts in Florida, where the
Thirteenth Judicial District (Hillsborough County) and the
Fifteenth Judicial District (Palm Beach County) have both created EJCs to address issues of elders. The EJC in Palm Beach
County was moved in 2005 for fiscal and administrative purposes to the Division of Justice Services in the county’s
Department of Public Safety.
The overarching mission of each center is to remove access
b a rriers to the judicial system and to enhance linkages between
elders and the court system, as well as the legal, health, and
social service systems. They differ significantly, however, in
focus. Hillsborough directs two-thirds of its resources to the
Probate Court to assist with establishing accountability in
guardianship cases, and the balance to serving victims of abuse
and other crimes and to general assistance for elders with other
matters. It is prohibited by terms of its funding from serving

23. Supreme Judicial Court of the Court System of Massachusetts,
Gender Bias Study (1989).
24. Id.
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o ffenders. Palm Beach has a strong focus on elders arrested for
crimes, including elders placed in jail, as well as a broad variety
of other legal matters that are re f e rred to the EJC by the court.
Recently EJC staff in Palm Beach County began assisting the
Probate Court by reviewing guardianship reports, and conducting court - o rdered investigations to ascertain the status and
well-being of wards of the court.
Both EJCs function in support of the judicial system, not as
independent advocates for particular elders. They provide
i n f o rmation and re f e rrals to elders as appropriate, while also
s e rving as experts to judges on the backgrounds and needs of
individual defendants or victims. Both centers try to address
the inevitable fear, confusion, uncert a i n t y, and lack of confidence experienced by many elders confronting the courts for
perhaps the first time, especially those with dementia or mental-health issues. These experiences can be quite traumatic
regardless of an individual’s status as victim, defendant, or witness.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO ELDER ISSUES

Given this background concerning recent trends in judicial
administration, the following addresses how courts are dealing
with specific issues involving older adults:
Ensure physical access to the courts, including appro p r i a t e
assistance for those with vision and hearing problems.
E v e ry jurisdiction in the United States, pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), is responsible for
ensuring physical access to the courthouse, courtrooms, and
o ffices within them. All jurisdictions have a designated ADA
o fficer responsible for compliance and for meeting special
needs. In Palm Beach and Hillsborough counties in Florida,
the EJCs offer one added level of assistance specifically for older
persons in need, as appropriate. In general, there were no obvious ADA issues apparent during site visits.
However, the issue of hearing effectively in court rooms was
identified by a number of interviewees and was experienced
firsthand by the investigators. The National Judicial College in
Reno, Nevada, has a model court room designed to enhance listening by all parties and includes speakers throughout the
room. A family-court judge in Reno said he had observed hearing problems even in new courthouses and recommended use
of a dedicated court room specifically designed for persons with
accessibility and hearing problems. The Delaware judiciary has
state-of-the-art court rooms in the New Castle County
Courthouse, with speakers throughout and excellent acoustics.
Each court room has headsets or “phonic ears” available for
amplification. Monitors are located throughout the courtroom,
including one for every two seats in the jury box, to ensure visibility of exhibits. Ramps and handrails ensure full access for
jurors and witnesses.
These types of innovations will be more important as the
number of older people participating in legal proceedings in
already older courtrooms increase. An older person in a typical

25. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee on Racial and Gender
Bias in the Justice System, Final Report (2003).

courtroom with less-than-modern acoustics will have difficulty
hearing not only as a member of the audience, but also as a litigant, witness, or member of the jury. This represents a thre s hold issue that should be addressed and regularly monitored—
not only for compliance with ADA re q u i rements, but to ensure
older people can effectively participate in all proceedings.
Assess older adults who are incarcerated following arrest or
booking in order to assist courts with making appropriate decisions about dementia, mental illness, or physical-health pro blems that could impact the next steps in legal proceedings.
This issue provided the underlying impetus for creation of
the EJC in Palm Beach County, Florida. There was considerable
community concern that older persons arrested and jailed
should be assessed as quickly as possible, at least for the purpose of recommending a full assessment or alternative placement to the presiding judge at the first appearance.
Furthermore, EJC staff are able to tap into private insurance
when available to pay for assessments and services. Most jurisdictions provide some type of “pretrial services,” whether under
court administration as in Washoe County, Nevada (Reno), or
under county government as in Hennepin County, Minnesota
(Minneapolis), for screening new arrestees. In fact, the vast
majority of responding courts surveyed indicated that someone
from the court carries out an initial screening to ascertain the
need for a full assessment. However, only a third of these court s
reported this person attends a first appearance with the arre s t e e .
Palm Beach County is the only jurisdiction identified that has
established a specific responsibility for its EJC to preliminarily
screen all persons 60 and over prior to the first appearance and
within 24 hours of arrest. This has resulted in court approval
for hospitalization, assessment for mental illness or dementia,
or alternative placement in assisted living, pending disposition.
The EJC’s intervention has prevented a significant number of
older people from spending unnecessary time in jail while
awaiting trial.
Although addressing a later stage than booking in the judicial process, Broward County, Florida, has in operation the
Broward Senior Intervention and Education program (BSIE),
which is a voluntary pretrial intervention program for persons
60 and older who have been arrested for a misdemeanor for the
first time. Arrestees typically are contacted, initially at arr a i g nment or prior to arraignment, by a BSIE counselor and off e red
the opportunity to undergo a three-month individual counseling schedule as well as social rehabilitation, which consists of
participation in a social activity at a senior center or community
volunteer service. In re t u rn for completion of the program
requirements, all adjudication and court costs are waived. The
program is administered by a nonprofit senior- s e rvices agency,
which also may refer these pretrial clients to other social services as needed. The recidivism rate for the few thousand
a rrestees who have completed the program since its inception
in 1979 is less than 3%. The program is funded through the
area agency on aging and the City of Hollywood Police
Department’s Law Enforcement Trust Fund.
There is a basic question of whether law enforcement
should, in appropriate situations, coordinate immediately with
mental-health or dementia-specific agencies following arrest
rather than booking an individual in jail in the first place. As a
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nate with a complex healthand social-services network,
a task not easily undertaken without prior working relationships and an acceptable protocol for all parties involved.
Regardless of how many older people are arrested each month
in a given jurisdiction, the potential implications resulting fro m
inappropriate or unnecessary jailing warrant specialized attention to this issue and development of a community protocol.
In an ongoing effort to address issues involving adults with
special needs, the Hennepin County Police/Mental Health
Roundtable has published a “Protocol to Request Assessment of
Adults with Special Needs Who Are Inmates of the Hennepin
County Adult Detention Center.” It is designed to inform mental-health professionals, county adult-protective-services workers, and social-services case managers about procedures for special handling or release from jail. Although it does not focus on
the immediate aftermath of arrest and booking, and requires
that the professional already have knowledge that a given individual is in detention, it is very useful as an example of the type
of written protocol essential for addressing this issue in any
jurisdiction. Increasingly, availability of services for special
populations, particularly elders with dementia and/or mentalhealth problems who may have committed a crime, is problematic. This underscores even more dramatically the import a n c e
of close linkages among the judiciary, law enforcement, corre ctions, and health-care professionals.
Educate the judiciary and courthouse staff about issues of
aging and the special concerns and problems of elders engaged
in the legal system.
The president of the National Judicial College in Reno,
Nevada, William Dressel, believes that it is important to create
a “field of knowledge” about elders and the courts since none
exists at this time. He is joined in this assessment by many of
the judges, administrators, and human services professionals
i n t e rviewed during site visits. In fact, many of them believe
that judicial education about aging is a primary issue that needs
to be addressed in order to improve access and justice for older
people.
A probate judge in Maricopa County, Arizona, underscored
the importance of this issue by focusing on the need to have
knowledge of clinical and medical issues in order to be more
effective. A dru g - c o u rt judge in Hennepin County, Minnesota,
emphasized the need to be knowledgeable about health- and
social-services systems in order to coordinate services and estabCourt Review 13

lish accountability for outcomes. The chief judge in
Hennepin County noted that
the biggest problem is that the
age issue is not yet on “the
radar screen, but should
become the focus of judicial
education if the demographics
justified it.” The chief judge of
the Family Court in Delaware believes that the courts “have to
start looking at these issues as a jurisdiction.” Interestingly, a
number of judges and professionals argued that education about
the facts of aging, i.e., the physiological, psychological, and
social dimensions, is a critical first step in fostering greater “judicial sensitivity” to elders and their special issues, thereby
increasing its priority within the judicial system. An attorney in
Reno observed that family-court judges who handle guardianship cases gain expertise over time, are more respectful, treat
elders better, and humanize a process in which elders often feel
intimidated. In general, a judge who has a more sophisticated
understanding of aging will be more sensitive to underlying
issues and can manage cases more effectively and efficiently.
Because jurisdictions differ significantly among the states,
particularly in their use of problem-solving or specialty courts,
education should not be limited to one type of court or judge.
Judges in most sites believe that education about aging would
enhance all judges’ knowledge and sensitivity about aging as
well as improve their abilities to manage cases. Some part i c ularly emphasize its importance in problem-solving courts such
as a mental-health or family court in terms of increased knowledge, and ability to speak with and relate more effectively to
older people on all issues affecting their lives. In this context,
a mental-health court judge in Bro w a rd County, Florida,
emphasized the specialty-court judge’s ability to overcome barriers to services and to ensure accountability for delivering
them effectively. Despite this near consensus of sentiment,
however, two-thirds of respondents to the electronic surv e y
reported that no formal training was offered and all indicated
that any training that occurred was voluntary.

[J]udicial education
about aging and
health-care
systems is a
priority need in
most jurisdictions.

Ensure that older adults who otherwise come into contact with
the court system are re f e rred, as appropriate, to publicly
funded or private attorneys, and to health, mental-health, and
social-services organizations to address nonlegal problems
that may affect their participation in the legal system.
The issue of referral ranges from providing a re f e rral to a private attorney or a legal-services program for someone who
enters a courthouse bearing legal papers but no knowledge
about what to do with them, through a court ’s ability to address
the mental-health needs of someone charged with criminal
behavior. Thus, it includes assistance from a court ’s self-help
center, available in most jurisdictions visited to assist persons in
obtaining and preparing legal papers necessary for pro se re p resentation in many legal matters. It also includes potentially
much more complex situations in which underlying causes,
e.g., mental illness or dementia, have resulted in a criminal act.
In the latter example, a court may need to harness extensive
external services in order to respond effectively to an offender’s
needs. All of these situations will continue to grow in number
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and complexity as most communities’ experience population
aging in the coming years. In this context, it is notable that
more than 20% (22%) of courts responding to the survey said
their court did not refer older adults to any community entity.
The challenge to the judiciary lies in how each jurisdiction and
individual judge responds in order both to manage cases more
efficiently and to dispense justice fairly and effectively in each
case to the satisfaction of the broader community.
The self-help center is a primary tool many jurisdictions utilize to address some of these issues. Although outreach to the
community is typically quite limited, these centers provide
extensive materials on community resources, legal forms to
access probate and family courts, for example, and technical
assistance on how to proceed with certain types of litigation.
Phoenix, Reno, Wilmington, and Minneapolis have state-ofthe-art centers that render re f e rrals to attorneys and serv i c e
agencies and deliver services intended to facilitate effective
access to the courts. Palm Beach County has established
through its EJC an additional office of professionals specializing
in assistance to elders. The EJC in Tampa, although not connected to a self-help center, also provides the same type of “special expertise” on behalf of elders, particularly victims. These
o ffices are people oriented and staffed by professionals trained
to negotiate complex legal and health-care systems. The dire ctor of the Maricopa County Court’s Phoenix Guardian Review
Project favors an “elderly advocate” who can navigate within
and among courts as needed to help achieve positive outcomes
through effective communication and coordination of effort.
Phoenix is now studying the best way to organize current
efforts in self-help, probate and mental-health, family, and perhaps, criminal court, into a “Senior Law Resource Center” to
achieve this objective.
As noted above, judicial education about aging and healthcare systems is a priority need in most jurisdictions. Complex
criminal cases present substantial challenges to courts stru ggling to ensure justice, for example, in a domestic-violence case
involving a frail older victim and a spouse or companion perpetrator who is in the early stages of dementia. The Palm Beach
County EJC was designed “to develop and enhance linkages”
for this purpose and to advise and assist judges who want to
coordinate service plans as part of a sentence or case disposition. Judges need quality information on options available and
the capacity to design and implement plans unique to each
case. The experiences of mental-health, drug, and other problem-solving courts are analogous in many respects and, according to one judge in Minneapolis, represent precedents for
enabling courts to alter the traditional paradigm, focus on people’s total needs, and bring new levels of passion, commitment,
and coordination to resolution of complex human problems. In
Reno, the administrator of the drug court and a new mentalhealth court has a dedicated budget to fund providers of services and, therefore, an enhanced capacity to hold them
accountable for specified outcomes in court-ordered plans.
Educate law-enforcement, health, mental-health, and socialservice organizations about issues and barriers aff e c t i n g
elder’s involvement with the court system.
There is near uniform agreement that law enforcement and
s e rvice providers need to be educated about aging and the inter-

section between elders and the courts. This is an objective of
the Palm Beach County EJC, and progress has been made conc e rning arrests of elders. In Tampa, the EJC works collaboratively with law enforcement to ensure services for victims are
delivered promptly and responsively. As discussed previously,
the Hennepin County Police/Mental Health Roundtable has
developed a protocol regarding adults with special needs in jail
and maintains an ongoing dialogue outside the judicial system.
Although there are initiatives around the country to educate
law enforcement and health-care professionals on issues of
elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation, there does not appear to
be any community-based, sustained effort to assemble these
groups, together with court administrative staff, to address
issues affecting elders and the criminal law. Most of those interviewed, with the exception of a few mental-health-court judges,
did not view such an assembly as a pressing need at this time.
The issue of educating health-care and social-services
providers is an intriguing one. For the most part, except for
adult-pro t e c t i v e - s e rvices offices and mental-health and substance-abuse providers already linked to problem-solving
courts, most agencies have few relationships with law enforc ement and the courts, particularly regarding elders. As a result,
s e rvices in most communities are not designed for an offender
population and are typically unavailable when needed. In this
context, the EJC concept offers potential to serve as a catalyst
for addressing issues affecting procedures and services for both
victims and offenders.
Educate older adults and the general community about issues
of access to the courts and typical legal issues that may aff e c t
them.
Courts can take a proactive role in educating different constituencies concerning the judicial system and typical areas of
the law that may affect them. This can improve access and help
prevent legal issues from ever reaching the courts. Because
court systems are ultimately accountable to the public for support, elections of judges (in many jurisdictions), and funding
for operations, they display an enlightened self-interest in wanting to reach out to diverse segments of the community. Fourfifths of courts responding to the survey indicated their court
provided education to older adults regarding court access and
common legal issues as part of a general effort to educate their
communities.
The EJCs in Tampa and Palm Beach counties regularly speak
to groups of older residents about legal issues, the courts, and
s e rvices available. In effect, they take the self-help center concept one step further by making information available beyond
the courthouse and by placing it directly into the hands of
potential users of court services. This is of great value to older
adults because it eliminates the need to travel to the courthouse.
Older people may receive information on how to avoid consumer fraud; reporting abuse, neglect, and exploitation; family
matters; understanding guardianship; and planning for longt e rm care and end-of-life issues. Information also may address
landlord-tenant and mortgage-foreclosure situations. In general,
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information can incre a s e
The Phoenix courts
understanding and demystify
conduct outreach
the court system for potential
older participants.
meetings in various
The Phoenix courts concommunities with
duct outreach meetings in
judges and
various communities with
judges and administrators as
administrators as
speakers. They have learn e d
speakers.
personally of the high level of
interest and concern about
probate issues of guardianship and civil commitment. A Family
Court Advisory Council, including elders, has raised issues
about grandparents’ rights such as custody and visitation. The
court is considering creation of an elder website. The chief
judge in Minneapolis believes court liaisons to the elder community, particularly in minority communities with less experience in the courts and fewer resources to purchase legal assistance, are increasingly important. A probate judge in
Minneapolis stressed the importance of community awareness
about legal requirements concerning end-of-life decision making, i.e., available choices to avoid ending up in court. The
director of the self-help center in Wilmington emphasized the
importance of engendering trust by elders in the judicial process
by working with them through community groups, especially in
minority communities. In Reno, the director of the self-help
center wants to take information and materials on the courts to
senior centers and libraries using a “Self-Help Center on
Wheels” model to maximize outreach. This concept is also supported by Guardian Review Project professionals in Phoenix.
Address the availability of sufficient numbers of guardians and
the court’s capacity to review and monitor guardianship
reports.
The president of the National Judicial College characterizes
the area of guardianship and conservatorships as the “ticking
time bomb” of the courts because of their general lack of capacity to establish accountability for the actions of guardians.
However, he perceives little interest outside of Arizona and
Florida in these issues, and judges in other jurisdictions agree
with that assessment. This is the single largest area of judicial
activity involving elders and large sums of money, but nonetheless is re f e rred to by many respondents as the judiciary ’s
“stepchild.” For various reasons, analysts have found that years
of effort to achieve legislative re f o rm have yielded little in positive outcomes.26 Marshall Kapp urges a guardianship system
that is founded on principles of therapeutic jurisprudence and
argues for more research to assess outcomes based on the actual
impact of the system on elders’ lives. Israel Doron goes even
further in recommending a change from the current concept of
guardianship to a new legal model of “long-term legal care.”
This is a novel idea that conceptualizes guardianship law as a
component of home and community-based care and utilizes
shared decision making as a way to empower elders to help
choose appropriate care.

Guardianship to Long-Term Legal Care, 8 ETHICS, LAW & AGING
REV. 117 (2002).
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Although approached differently in each jurisdiction,
Phoenix, Tampa, and Ft.
L a u d e rdale have org a n i z e d
p rototype mechanisms for
a d d ressing
guard i a n s h i p
issues. The Guardian Review
P roject in Phoenix is
designed to review files and
annual reports, re c ruit and
train a cadre of volunteers to
visit wards and file reports,
and identify service needs
and financial abuse. A supervisor and two pro f e s s i o n a l
s t a ff oversee 30 volunteers
and collaborate with a team
of three investigators, three accountants, one probate examiner,
and two paralegals. These resources are unequaled in any other
jurisdiction visited and perhaps in any other jurisdiction in the
United States. The priority assigned to this area, and the corresponding area of civil commitment, reflects an understanding
not only of current and future demographics, but also the
importance and value of these cases in both personal and financial terms. This is a model worthy of further evaluation of outcomes in order to assess potential replicability.
Absence of resources available to support this responsibility
is a major barrier in most jurisdictions. Leadership of the probate judge in Tampa, who originally sought to create an “Elder
Court,” led to creation of the EJC and attracted funding fro m
private foundations to support two full-time court counselors
who review case files, initial and annual reports, and guardian
and attorney billings. Both the judge and a special master re cognize the need for establishing financial accountability, and the
clerk’s office will be hiring an auditor to help address this gap.
Together, judges and EJC professionals are working to attract
more guardians, improve training and licensure requirements,
establish standards for selecting committee members assessing
an individual’s need for a guardian, and, as in Minneapolis, are
exploring implementation of the emerging concept of mediation
in guardianship cases.
The probate judge in Ft. Lauderdale, a well-recognized leader
in the field, receives funding from county government to support a Probate and Guardian Services Counsel. He has the
capacity to audit and review files and reports similar to that conducted by the EJC in Tampa (and well underway by the EJC in
Palm Beach). The judge is working with his staff on a new stateof-the-art data-management system essential for establishing
oversight and accountability. He is seeking to interest local law
schools in working on these issues and is participating on a state
task force to help establish improved standards for guardians
and the guardianship system.
These programs, as noted, are models. Most jurisdictions do
not report having this level of priority or resources in the area of
guardianships and conservatorships. A full 90% of surv e y

Minneapolis and
Reno both have
identified the issue
of grandparents
seeking
guardianship or
custody over
grandchildren. .. .
[and] are preparing
informational and
self-help
materials . . . .
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respondents indicated their courts reviewed guardianship
reports for timeliness and reasonableness, but only one-third
reported that in-depth monitoring takes place. Individual
judges and administrators recognize the importance of the
issues but have not yet elevated it sufficiently to attract
resources. By contrast, in Reno, the court allocates space to
SAFE, a private not-for-profit organization that recruits and
trains volunteers to act as companions, not guardians, for wards
re f e rred from judges in family court. Similar to a guardian ad
litem program for children, this state-funded program (fro m
tobacco-settlement money) relies on court orders to gather
i n f o rmation on the situation and on the well-being of wards,
while volunteers file reports with the court. Fifty-six volunteers
from ages 25 to 82 carry one to five cases, averaging 100 hours
a year per case. These volunteers receive university-level training and have access to the program’s forensic psychologist for
consultation. In the absence of dedicated court staff as
described above, SAFE represents an imaginative alternative to
responding to at least some of the issues identified in rapidly
growing caseloads involving guardians.
A final note on guardianships involves self-help centers that
are expanding in size and in the types of matters addressed.
Minneapolis and Reno both have identified the issue of grandparents seeking guardianship or custody over grandchildren
when parents are no longer able to function as parents. Both are
preparing informational and self-help materials to address this
relatively new and growing body of cases.
Maintain an information system capable of tracking the case
status of individual older adults, documenting outcomes, and
compiling summary data on the legal, health, and social-service needs of older adults entering the judicial system in order
to help identify patterns or issues for legislative, programmatic,
and/or budgetary improvements.
As expected, no jurisdiction routinely captures data on elders
in the court system. None of the survey respondents indicated
that his or her court tracked demographics, health and medical
data, or financial data on older adults—even though 90%
reported that their computer systems did allow tracking of older
adults. The two Florida EJCs are developing their own information systems to track clients and improve management of
caseloads, report case trends, and identify service needs of
elders in court. Because of the singular importance of this issue,
it was the primary focus of technical assistance provided to the
EJC in Palm Beach County.27 As noted above, the Probate Court
in Ft. Lauderdale is directing a circuit-court project on data
management that is intended to be state-of-the-art in the belief
that automation is the key element for improved oversight and
accountability in guardianship cases.
The more typical response in sites visited, however, is that
i n f o rmation systems in general are primitive and in need of
m o d e rnization. Nonetheless, a system, regardless of its level of
sophistication, will produce useful data and reports on elders
only when it is programmed to do so. This will not occur unless
a jurisdiction (i.e., chief judge, court administrator, or perhaps,

an individual judge) establishes aging as a legitimate priority
area of concern and requests information on elder-related indicators on a regular basis. This does not happen, however, in
any of the jurisdictions visited. The directors of management
i n f o rmation services and court statisticians interviewed were all
in various stages of improving their systems to keep pace with
the state of technology but had never been asked to produce
data on older adults. They agree that there are no legal impediments to recording and capturing data on age and producing
reports useful for judges, administrators, and professionals on a
regular basis.
These data are useful for case tracking and for understanding legal areas of significant involvement by elders by type of
case, length, monetary value, levels of jury participation, or any
other desired measure. Data on service needs of elders can be
utilized to help mobilize health-care and social-service agencies
and professionals to work collaboratively to address serviced e l i v e ry issues and to identify priorities for future funding.
Initiatives of this nature are invaluable in raising the profile of
elders in the courts and in building momentum for improved
access, responsiveness of judges, and collaboration with others
in the community. Finally, timely and relevant data are essential for applying Trial Court Perf o rmance Standards to issues of
older adults.
Utilize technology to help improve access and effective
participation by older adults in the court system.
Technology is essential to addressing issues of access and
i n f o rmation systems, as discussed above. Interestingly, about
one-half (16 of 33) of survey respondents indicated their court
did not use any media or technology to help improve access and
effective participation in the court system specifically for older
adults. Perhaps the most important use of technology is in the
courtroom itself. The “technology court” in Wilmington is
state-of-the-art and responds meaningfully to the needs of older
adults. Video conferencing is now a reality there and has great
potential for reducing travel and expense to reach centralized
courthouses. Phoenix is expanding its self-help center’s capacity to offer legal forms online. It is possible that a court’s website could have useful information about typical areas of legal or
court involvement by older people and instructions and checklists on how to be prepared for participation in court pro c e e dings. Mobile vans can transport self-help centers and even
courtrooms to distant locations.
Although the state of courthouse technology will undoubtedly continue to evolve, leadership is still required to establish
priorities for purposes not only of management efficiency but
also of effective use by everyone in the community. The dire ctor of the Minneapolis self-help center argues that “people need
to have confidence in the courts,” and be assured that they are
listened to throughout the process. If people, including elders,
understand what is happening to them in the courthouse, especially in the court room, confusion and anxiety will be re d u c e d .
There is widespread agreement that in the courts, as in health
care, high tech cannot replace high touch.
Obtain resources and staff to appropriately carry out any or all
of these functions.
It is the challenge of leadership to assemble resources to

meet organizational prioriCourts are
ties. Roughly 90% of court
challenged to
s u rvey respondents indicated
that designated court staff
respond to
c a rry out one or more of the increasing numbers
functions covered in the surof cases involving
vey. More than half reported
that volunteers carry out older people, often
these functions as well.
with complex
These same respondents also
underlying
reported that these functions
problems.
a re funded from multiple
sources: from 42% citing
court administration to one respondent identifying a national
foundation as a funding source. As issues of older adults
increasingly affect the courts, chief judges and court administrators will be expected to respond appropriately, even in a difficult fiscal environment. The probate judge in Tampa joined
funding from private foundations with the state’s Office of the
A t t o rney General (using funds designated to assist crime victims) to establish the state’s first EJC. In Palm Beach County,
the chief judge and court administrator secured county funds to
launch the EJC. The probate judge in Ft. Lauderdale leveraged
a newspaper exposé about the lack of judicial oversight of
guardians to generate county funding for professional staff and
design of a model information system.
Other examples abound. In Phoenix, the former court
administrator created a study group on probate issues to help
overcome the common perception of probate as the stepchild of
so many jurisdictions, resulting in the establishment of the
Guardian Review Project, as discussed previously. The Reno
SAFE project reflects an ongoing and unique collaboration
between the family court, which handles guardianships in
Nevada, and a private, not-for-profit organization (described
earlier) that utilizes volunteers as “companions” for wards in
cases re f e rred by the court. In Minneapolis, the probate court
processes 1,500 civil commitment cases a year and works
closely with the county’s human-services department to provide
case-management services under the state’s civil-commitment
law and to file reports with the court at the end of the sixmonth commitment period. In effect, county professional staff
function as a court - related resource to ensure accountability for
mandated services. In Broward County, Florida, the court benefits from a pre-trial intervention program, run by a local aging
s e rvices provider, that is funded by a local police depart m e n t
t rust fund as well as the area agency on aging.
Courts are challenged to respond to increasing numbers of
cases involving older people, often with complex underlying
problems. Funding, trained professional staff, and motivated
volunteers are all necessary resources for the courts to respond
effectively. Likewise, courts will have to develop imaginative
ways to attract students in law, social work, and other disciplines
to assist in these eff o rts. As the director of the EJC in Palm
Beach County states, “when you enter the courthouse, you enter
a foreign country.” For elders, often without resources, the
experience can be traumatic. The director of the Reno self-help
center in Reno agrees that most elders “don’t know the language.” It is the responsibility of court systems to prepare themselves to meet this challenge with passion and innovation.
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IV. ELDER JUSTICE CENTERS, ELDER COURTS, AND
OTHER RESPONSES TO AN AGING SOCIETY

The judiciary, as this article has documented, will have to
respond creatively to the demographics of aging just as other
institutions in American life are adjusting. Older adults are living longer and bringing more complex underlying issues into the
courthouse, challenging judges and court administrators to find
ways to identify problems early, establish effective linkages with
the health and social-services community, and ensure accountability for judicial orders. This article has cited experiences in
Florida and elsewhere that are beginning to achieve these objectives. The emerging concept of therapeutic jurisprudence, the
experience of problem-solving courts, the development of Trial
Court Perf o rmance Standards, and progress made with identifying and eliminating race, ethnic, and gender bias are indicative of
the judiciary ’s capacity to respond to changing conditions and
new challenges. Given the diversity of jurisdictions and judges,
there is no single approach to achieve this objective.
During site visits, Elder Justice Centers in Florida and the
concept of an Elder Court generated extensive discussion.
Some judges and administrators argued that no special eff o rt s
by the courts were justified on the basis of age and that all persons in the court system should be treated the same, consistent with ADA re q u i rements. However, most liked the EJC
concept, and many favored creation of a problem-solving
elder court.
In general, those who supported the EJC concept endorsed
it as an entry point for elders who would have an advocate
assisting with negotiation of a very complex judicial system.
Elders would receive relevant information concerning legal
matters, obtain re f e rrals to legal and social services as appro p r iate, and be assigned, if needed, a case manager whether in probate, mental-health, family, or criminal court. Social-serv i c e s
professionals would re c ruit, train, and supervise volunteers and
students to expand coverage and provide additional support .
They would be a source of technical support to judges in various divisions, particularly with respect to health, mentalhealth, and social-services systems. They would be “boundary
spanners” who establish linkages with service providers and
assist judges with development of treatment plans. They can
tap into elder’s insurance coverage and seek out other sources
of support for services. As the Tampa probate judge noted, dedicated staff are “invaluable” in guardianship matters because
their efforts allow the court to establish accountability for activities of guardians and their attorneys. Finally, as noted by a
court administrator in Phoenix who is working to shape a
senior law resource center, this concept can be designed to
build on a jurisdiction’s unique organization and strengths and
respond to identified community needs.
For similar reasons, many of those interviewed favored
creation of an elder court. Specialty-court judges and professionals, particularly in mental-health and drug courts, underscored the importance of being able to harness the composite of
s e rvices needed to help affect human behavior and generate
positive outcomes. Judges with specialized training and experience may recognize the absence of family and social support
and can mobilize services in support of treatment decisions.
The key is the court ’s connection to services and its ability to
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mobilize agencies and to hold the system accountable.
Jurisdictions with an integrated family court, perhaps including
responsibility for probate and mental-health matters involving
guardianships and civil commitments, family matters, and
domestic-violence cases, could shape dockets and designate
one judge to preside in an “Elder Court.” As one judge in
Minneapolis concluded, under a “one person, one judge” concept, an Elder Court could punish, commit, order services, or
designate a guardian. The key is a “judge with passion, not just
a case processor, but a judge who wants to deal with people, not
just lawyers!” The paradigm needs to shift to manifest a willingness to integrate and address all relevant issues affecting an
individual through caring, good judgment, and persistence.
In the future, it is possible to imagine jurisdictions with large
older constituencies making strategic decisions to implement
either or both of these concepts. Jurisdictions will differ based
on state constitutions and laws, local history and organization,
and judicial leadership. The availability of resources undoubtedly will be an important factor, but allocation of resources may
be equally as important. Although courts are always subject to
community pressure to respond to issues of crime and safety,
individual judges with passion and commitment can shape the
judicial landscape. As courts have responded creatively to
issues of race and gender, in the early years of the 21st century
they will be equally challenged to respond to the issues of an
aging America.
V. A MODEL APPROACH

As the analysis of experiences described above demonstrates,
there is no single approach to how an individual jurisdiction
should address issues of older adults. In fact, although most
courts consider the age of 60 as a threshold for consideration of
age, the experiences of Florida’s EJCs suggest most of their
work focuses on people 70 and over. Inevitably, there will be
wide variability in how jurisdictions approach these issues in
the coming years. Nonetheless, a model approach should
include the following elements:
1. An analysis of the jurisdiction’s demographics, including
numbers and percentages of older adults 60 and over, by 10year cohort s .
2. An analysis of state constitutional and legal requirements
concerning the organization and administration of local
court systems.
3. An internal review of how the jurisdiction’s judges and professional staff perceive issues affecting older people and
their recommendations to address these issues.
4. An external review by a community task force or advisory
group consisting of representatives from: the bar, including
prosecutor, public defender, and private bar; health-andh u m a n - s e rvices organizations, including adult-protective
services and mental-health and dementia-specific agencies;
older advocates; and law enforcement.
5. A review of the experiences of other jurisdictions, especially
focusing on EJCs and problem-solving courts.
6. Analysis of existing or potential resources to support any
new initiative.
7. Decision on a course of action tied to the availability of
resources.

8. Establishment of goals, objectives, and strategies to implement decisions over a 3-year period.
9. A strategic plan to address each of the 10 specific issues
described above in order to implement desired programs
and activities.
10. Inclusion of an evaluation component from the beginning in
order to track progress and measure outcomes.
The evaluation component is critical to courts’ capacity to
make policy decisions surrounding issues raised in this
report.28 Kapp emphasizes the importance of research that
applies the TJ approach described above, “which is concerned
with measuring outcomes or results on the intended beneficiaries.”29 He is concerned about evaluating the effects of laws,
programs, or judicial action on those intended to benefit fro m
them.
Each community, of course, is unique and by engaging in
“community mapping,” each jurisdiction can assemble data and
mobilize resources to respond most effectively to its own special circumstances. Courts in this country, although subject to
the ebb and flow of broader political and fiscal currents, have
the ability to set agendas, attract resources, and exercise moral
authority to meet new challenges. The next frontier for most
institutions in American life, including the judicial system, is
older age!
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DWI Courts:
The Newest Problem-Solving Courts
Victor E. Flango

P

roblem-solving court s — m o re accurately, specialized
dockets—are established to deal with problems that may
benefit from focused and sustained attention. These
courts include a treatment component in an effort to reduce
recidivism, which in turn reduces the number of future arrests,
prosecutions, and court cases.
Specialized drug courts appeared in the late 1980s in
response to the dramatic increase in drug offenses.1 Some drug
courts, often referred to as “drug-treatment courts,” emphasize
treatment as the way to reduce recidivism. Essential elements
of drug courts include: (1) immediate intervention; (2) nonadversarial adjudication; (3) hands-on judicial involvement;
(4) treatment programs with clear rules and structured goals;
and (5) a team approach that brings together the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, treatment provider, and correctional
staff.2 Although there are variations, the drug-treatment courts
usually include judicial supervision of community-based treatment, timely referral to treatment, regular status hearings to
monitor treatment progress, mandatory and periodic drug testing, and a system of graduated sanctions and rewards.3
The success of drug courts has renewed interest in other
types of problem-solving courts, such as community courts,
domestic-violence courts, and mental-health courts.4 The
newest such court to gain acceptance in many communities
handles alcohol-impaired drivers.
DWI COURTS

The high incidence of crimes committed while under the
influence of alcohol, including driving while impaired, has
prompted several jurisdictions to develop sobriety or DWI
(Driving While Impaired or Driving While Intoxicated) courts,
most based on the drug-court model. Specialized DWI courts
are reputed to be better equipped to handle DWI cases, which
permits swifter resolutions, reduces backlog, and improves
outcomes. Common characteristics of sobriety and DWI
courts include intense alcohol-addiction treatment and heavy
c o u rt supervision, with jail sentences as a last re s o rt .
Compliance with treatment and other court-mandated requirements is verified by frequent alcohol and drug testing, close

Footnotes
1. DRUG CTS. PROGRAM OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEFINING DRUG
COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS 9 (1997).
2. Peggy F. Hora, et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug
Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice
System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 N OTRE
DAME L. REV. 439, 453 (1999).
3. Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NAT’L
DRUG CT. INST. REV. 10, 14-15 (1998).
4. See, e.g., PAMELA M. CASEY & DAVID B. ROTTMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE CTS., PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: MODELS AND TRENDS (2003).
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community supervision, and interaction with the judge in
non-adversarial court review hearings.
DWI courts were established to protect public safety and to
reduce recidivism by attacking the root cause of impaired driving—impairment caused by alcohol and substance abuse. The
mission of sobriety and DWI courts is “to make offenders
accountable for their actions, bring about a behavioral change
that ends recidivism, stop the abuse of alcohol, and protect the
public; to treat the victims of DWI offenders in a fair and just
way; and to educate the public as to the benefits of sobriety
and DWI Courts for the communities they serve.”5
In other words, the DWI courts treat the problem as well as
punish the offender, because threats of punishment alone are
not likely to be sufficient to change the behavior of individuals.
DWI courts allow experienced judges to use treatment
resources and other sentencing options together, and thus to
sanction or reward offenders with greater consistency.6
Although the DWI offenders share some characteristics with
drug offenders (for example, they each share substance-abuse
problems that require treatment and a strong support system to
succeed), they also have differences. DWI offenders tend to be
male, employed, and slightly older than drug offenders; they
are more often able to draw on emotional resources, including
family, that are helpful to recovery.7
Unlike drug offenses, DWI offenses are not perceived as
“victimless” crimes because public safety and community
impact are more of an issue. Monitoring DWI offenders is
more difficult than monitoring drug-court participants because
alcohol goes through the body quickly and is more difficult to
detect than drugs. Alcohol is also legal and easier to obtain
than drugs.
HOW MANY DWI COURTS ARE THERE?

The National Association of Drug Court Professionals provided a list of 68 courts that were listed as specialized DWI
courts operational in 2003, some in conjunction with dru g
courts.8 All 68 were contacted in early 2004, and asked to provide information about the year they were established, the types
of cases they heard, the volume of cases heard, and recidivism

5. JEFF TAUBER & C. WEST HUDDLESTON, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST.,
DWI/DRUG COURTS: DEFINING A NATIONAL STRATEGY 5 (1999).
6. ROBYN D. ROBERTSON & HERB M. SIMPSON, TRAFFIC INJ. RES. FOUND.,
DWI SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH HARD CORE
DRINKING DRIVERS: ADJUDICATION AND SANCTIONING 19 (2002).
7. C. WEST HUDDLESTON & KAREN FREEMAN-WILSON, NAT’L DRUG CT.
INST., DWI/DRUG COURTS: DEFINING A NATIONAL STRATEGY 5 (1999).
8. The author is grateful to Kristen Daugherty of the National
Association of Drug Court Professionals for providing the initial
list of DWI Courts and to Katherine Knorr, an intern at National
Center for State Courts, for contacting each of the courts.

rates. Five of the courts turned out to be specialized courts, but
not DWI courts, and are not included in the analysis.
The table found at the end of this article presents this basic
information on these 63 courts as a baseline from which the
growth in specialized DWI courts can be monitored. It is clear
that many new DWI courts were created recently, after this
article was written and submitted for publication. Indeed, the
latest information from the National Drug Court Institute suggests that 176 DWI courts were in operation by the end of
2004, and that is not counting “hybrid” DWI courts—drug
courts that also accept DWI offenders.9 Although the National
Association of Drug Court Professionals is conscientious about
conducting regular surveys of all drug-court-related specialty
dockets, it is a daunting task to maintain an accurate, up-todate catalog of problem-solving courts.
Most of the DWI courts appear to have been developed from
drug courts, but there are exceptions. Of the 63 DWI court s ,
seven reported being established as separate courts. More than
a third of adult drug courts in the United States are in Californ i a ,
New York, Missouri, or Florida.10 Half of the family drug courts
are in the large states of California, New York, and Florida and a
third of the juvenile drug courts are found in these three states
plus Ohio. A third of the DWI courts, however, are in Michigan
(10), Idaho (6), and Indiana (6).11 Thus, although DWI courts
were created from drug courts, the states with the largest number of drug courts do not have the most DWI courts. DWI
courts are also not more prevalent in states that have an unusually high number of alcohol-related fatalities.
All of the courts were established rather recently (after
1994), except for the Los Angeles Superior Court DUI Program
and the Hancock County, Indiana, DWI Court, both established
in 1971. Forty of the 63 were established in 2000 or later.
Most DWI courts (54 of 63) do not accept violent offenders
into the program. A much smaller number do not accept juvenile offenders (14) or sex offenders (8) into their programs.
Caseloads are, and perhaps need to be, small. The vast majority of DWI courts (49 of the 63) handle fewer than 100 cases
per year.
DWI COURT ISSUES

Several issues that are not unique to DWI courts, but arise
to varying degrees with all problem-solving courts, would
benefit from further research as DWI courts mature.

9. C. WEST HUDDLESTON III, ET AL., NAT’L DRUG CT. INST., PAINTING THE
CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND
OTHER PROBLEM SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2005) Table VI, p. 16. Note that the National Association of Drug
Court Professionals includes in their totals DWI courts that are
planned, but not yet operational. DWI courts not in operation are
not counted in this study.
10. See, e.g., C. WEST HUDDLESTON III ET AL., NAT’L DRUG CT. INST.,
PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG
COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2004).
11. Since this article was written, the number of DWI courts in
Michigan has increased to 16 and the number of DWI courts in
Idaho has reached 10. California now has at least 10 DWI courts,
Georgia 7, and Pennsylvania 5. An up-to-date list of operational

Role of the Judge. Despite the use of problem-solving courts
in many arenas, the concern persists that judges are more
involved with defendants, so it is more difficult for them to
remain impartial. Judges need to praise and sanction defendants, but must avoid getting so involved personally that their
impartiality is at risk. As problem-solving courts proliferate,
however, these concerns appear to be lessening as is the countervailing concern that DWI court sanctions may appear to be
more coercive than those used in traditional courts. Use of sanctions that have judges telling a defendant where to live or where
to work; that require defendants to use prescription drugs, such
as Naltrexone and Antabuse; or that require invasive treatments, like acupuncture, may be perceived as going beyond the
scope of traditional judicial authority.
Resources. Would non-specialized courts perform as well if
given the same resources and access to treatment as specialized
DWI courts? Critics may argue that specialized DWI courts are
indeed more successful than other courts because they have so
many more resources, which they require if they are to have frequent review hearings, frequent testing for alcohol use, progress
reports from probation officers and addiction counselors, etc.
To determine the appropriate workload levels for specialized
DWI courts as well as for other courts having jurisdiction over
DWI cases, workload assessments are necessary.12
A workload assessment measures more than just caseload;
rather, it is a measure of the amount of judge time necessary to
dispose of cases properly. The best way to assess the need for
judges and court support staff is to do a full workload assessment, which takes into account the amount of time it takes to
resolve the “mix” of cases each judge hears, both currently and
ideally.13 Doing so will measure not only the average amount
of time it takes to dispose of DWI cases, but also the amount of
time it takes to keep current with the entire docket.
Another cost for some courts is the integrated information system required to track individuals through case-processing stages
and to determine whether they have met the various screening,
treatment, and other requirements imposed by the court.
Effectiveness. At a national conference of Mothers Against
Drunk Driving, Dr. Jeffrey Runge announced that one of the
three impaired-driving priorities for NHTSA was DWI adjudication and supervision.14 Part of this priority is to establish
DWI courts, expand drug courts, or apply the drug-court model
to DWI cases.

DWI courts is being kept on the National Center for State Courts
website. Please view this list online http://www.ncsconline.org/
D_KIS/DWI/index.html and report any additions or corrections to
gflango@ncsc.dni.us.
12. See generally VICTOR E. FLANGO, & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CENTER
FOR ST. CTS., ASSESSING THE NEED FOR JUDGES AND COURT SUPPORT
STAFF (1996) (discussion of workload assessments).
13. See generally BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AT., NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS.,
MINNESOTA JUDICIAL WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT, 2002 (2003), and
BRIAN J. OSTROM, ET AT., MINNESOTA COURT STAFF WORKLOAD
ASSESSMENT, 2004 (2004) (excellent examples of both a judicial
and a court staff workload assessment).
14. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., I MPAIRED DRIVING UPDATE
(2003).
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Do DWI courts differ from other courts in DWI recidivism
rates? Is there a difference in recidivism between DWI cases
resolved in special DWI courts as compared with DWI cases
handled in more general drug courts?
What decrease in
recidivism would be necessary to justify the additional
resources needed by a specialized docket? What resources and
treatment options would a traditional court require to produce
the same results as a specialized DWI court?
All DWI courts use particular criteria to screen offenders eligible for drug court. It appears that DWI courts are most successful with more habitual offenders rather than with first-time
offenders, who may deny that they have an alcohol problem.
How do screening criteria affect the success rates of DWI court s ?
Are DWI courts most effective with nonviolent offenders? Nonsex offenders? Felons or misdemeanants?15 An impartial evaluation of special DWI courts is needed to determine just how
effective they are in reducing recidivism over time and the practices that most contribute to the decrease in recidivism.

Victor Eugene Flango is executive director for
program resource development in the president’s
office at the National Center for State Courts.
From 1995 until April 2005, he served as vice
president of the National Center’s Research and
Technology Division. In that role, he led about
40 staff members in developing and managing
both research projects and technology for the
National Center. Before joining the National Center for State
Courts in 1977, Dr. Flango was a professor of political science at
Northern Illinois University and director of the Master of Arts in
Public Affairs program in judicial administration. His Ph.D. is
from the University of Hawaii (1970) and he is a fellow of the
Institute for Court Management.

SPECIALIZED DWI COURTS, 2003
STATE

YEAR
STARTED

COURT

CASE
TYPE

CASELOAD

REPORTED
RECIDIVISM RATE

DWI Courts. No stated restrictions on clients
1

AZ

Maricopa County DUI Court

1998

Both

20

25%

2

ID

Power County DUI/Drug Court

2000

Both

34

25%****

3

IN

Hancock County DWI Court

1971

Both

600

N/A

4

MI

43rd District Court - Ferndale Division**

2003

Misdemeanor

126

N/A

5

NH

Merrimack District DUI Court

2004

Misdemeanor

280-300

N/A

6

OH

Richland County Substance Abuse Treatment Court

1995

Felony

12

15%

7

TN

Shelby County DUI Court

2002

Misdemeanor

48

N/A

8

VA

Fredricksburg Regional DUI Court

1999

Both

N/A

0%

9

WA

Clark County Drug Court

1995

Both

15

N/A

10 10

AK

Wellness Court

Both

35

12%

Both

N/A (estimate
several hundred
in program)

N/A

DWI Courts. Do not accept violent offenders
2004

CA

Los Angeles Superior Court - Metropolitan
Courthouse DUI Program

1971

12

CA

Butte County Superior Court DUI Program

1996

Both

77

8%

13

CO

7th Judicial District DUI/Drug Court

2004

Misdemeanor

12

N/A

14

GA

Athens/Clarke County DUI/Drug Court

2003

Misdemeanor

100

N/A

15

GA

Chatham County DUI Court

2003

Misdemeanor

140

N/A

16

GA

Hall County DUI Court

2003

Misdemeanor

119

N/A

17

ID

Misdemeanor/DUI Drug Court (Madison County)

2000

Both

30

18

IN

Vigo County OVWI/DUI Court

2000

Both

16

19

ME

56A District DUI Court*

1997M/2000F

Both

35

N/A
0%, none rearrested in
county
14%

20

MI

46th District DUI Court

2003

Misdemeanor

N/A

21

MI

55th District Court Mason OUIL**

2004

Misdemeanor

22

MI

67th District DUI Court

2004

Both

6
N/A (anticipate
several hundred)
40-50

23

MI

86th District DUI Court

2001

Misdemeanor

100

N/A

11

15. This debate is parallel to the debate over a strategy to reduce
alcohol- or drug-related crashes. Is it better to focus on the
relatively small proportion of the driving population responsible
for a large percentage of alcohol/drug-related crashes, i.e., the
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N/A
N/A

hard-core offenders, or on the much larger number of moderatedrinking drivers whose very numbers contribute significantly to
the problem, although their individual risk of crashes is relatively
low?

STATE

COURT

YEAR
STARTED

CASE
TYPE

CASELOAD

REPORTED
RECIDIVISM RATE

24

MI

Livingston County Adult Drug**

1999

Felony

25

2%

25

NC

Mecklenberg County DWI Treatment Court

2000

Both

123

11%

26

NC

25th District DWI Treatment Court

1995

Misdemeanor

25

2%

27

NC

26th Superior Court District DWI Drug Treatment Court

2000

Both

123

11%

28

ND

South Central Judicial District DUI Court

2001

Both

N/A

N/A

29

NM

Municipal Court of Santa Fe DUI Court

1998

Misdemeanor

N/A

N/A

30

NY

Otsego County Drug Treatment

2000

Both

34

14%

31

NY

North Tonawanda City Court

1995

Both

100

10%

32

NY

Washington County Superior Court - DUI Court

2003

Both

25

N/A

33

OK

Muskogee Nation DUI/Drug Court

1981

Both

3

N/A

34

OR

Ninth Judicial District DUI Court

2001

Both

6

N/A

35

UT

City of Taylorsville Municipal Justice Substance Abuse Court

1998

Misdemeanor

N/A

16/17

36

WY

Lincoln County Circuit Court DUI/Drug Court

2000

Both

12

N/A

37

AL

34th Judicial DUI Court

2001

Felony

5

N/A

38

ID

Kootenai County DUI Court

2001

Misdemeanor

40

5%

39

IN

Clark County OVWI/DUI Court

N/A

Both

5

N/A

40

IN

Dearborn/Ohio County OVWI/DUI Court

2002

Felony

12

N/A

41

NY

Fulton County Drug Court

1998

First Felony

25-30

5%

42

AZ

Coconino County DUI/Drug Court

2004

Both

55

7%

43

IN

Johnson County/Greenwood City OVWI/DUI Court

1999

Both

50 (estimate)

N/A

44

IN

Monroe County DUI Court

1999

Felony

27

5%

45

MI

35th District Court Plymouth Sobriety Court**

2004

Misdemeanor

8

N/A

46

MI

51st District DUI Court**

2001

Misdemeanor

600

17%

47

MI

52-1 District Sobriety Court**

2001

Misdemeanor

88

3%

48

MI

52-4 District Drug Therapy Court

2001

Misdemeanor

40

14%

49

MO

St. Charles County DWI Court

2000

Felony

60-70

4%

50

MS

14th District DUI Court

2002

Felony

15

N/A

51

NM

Las Cruces Municipal DWI Court

1994

Misdemeanor

500-600

N/A

52

NM

Bernalillo County DWI Court

1997

Misdemeanor

95

8%

53

NM

11th Judicial Circuit DWI Court

1995

Misdemeanor

50

2%

54

OK

Creek County DUI/Drug Court

1997

Both

75

35%

55

PA

Berks County DUI Court

2003

Misdemeanor

N/A

N/A

56

PA

Lackawanna County DUI Court

2002

Misdemeanor

30-40

N/A

57

TN

Unicoi-Washington County Alcohol and Drug Court

2001

Misdemeanor

30

5%

58

ID

7th Judicial District Juvenile DUI/Drug Court

2000

Juvenile

10

N/A

59

ID

7th Judicial District Misdemeanor DUI/Drug Court
(Bingham Bonneville)

2000

Misdemeanor

17

5%

60

ID

7th Judicial District Felony DUI/Drug Court

2000

Felony

15

7%

61

AK

Bethel Therapeutic Court

2001

Misdemeanor

35

N/A

62

TN

23rd Judicial District DWI Court

2001

Felony*

12

0%

63

ME

Isabella County DUI Court

DWI Courts. Do not accept violent offenders or sex offenders

DWI Courts. Do not accept violent offenders or juvenile offenders

DWI Courts. Do not accept violent offenders, mental-illness cases, or clients previously receiving treatment

DWI Courts. Do not accept violent offenders, sex offenders, or mental-illness cases

DWI Courts. Do not accept violent offenders, sex offenders, or juvenile cases

Both = Felonies and Misdemeanors
* Court has jurisdiction over felonies and misdemeanors, but DWI Court
serves only people accused of felonies.
** Indicates a court that began independently from a drug court.

2004

Both

9

N/A

*** Does not accept clients who had previous treatment.
**** Rate reported for misdemeanors; recidivism rate for felons 0%, but
20% of those eligible did not participate.
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Recent Criminal Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2004-2005 Term
Charles Whitebread

T

he 2004-2005 Term of the Supreme Court off e red no
blockbuster rulings. Nonetheless, in what turned out to
be the final year for the Rehnquist Court, there were ru lings of note on topics ranging from securities fraud to sentencing guidelines. In one case, the Court looked to foreign law as
a model for determining whether to prohibit the death penalty
as a sentence for juvenile criminal offenders. It will be interesting to see, with changes in the Court ’s membership, whether
this trend to look toward foreign law in constitutional or other
criminal cases continues. In this article, I will review the
Court’s criminal-law decisions from the past term. In the next
issue of C o u rt Review, I will review the Court ’s civil decisions.
FOURTH AMENDMENT

In Devenpeck v. Alford,1 Justice Scalia, writing for all the justices except Chief Justice Rehnquist, who took no part in the
decision, held that there is no additional limitation on the
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement that the
offense giving rise to probable cause be “closely related” to the
offense to which the officer refers at the time of arrest. Using
wig-wag headlights, respondent stopped to assist a disabled
vehicle, and left quickly as a Washington state patroller pulled
up. When questioned, the occupants of the disabled vehicle
informed the patrolman that they thought respondent was a
police officer. The patrolman pursued respondent and was
later joined by his supervisor. The patrolmen discovered wigwag lights on respondent’s car, that he was listening to a Kitsap
County Sheriff’s Office on a special radio, and that he had
handcuffs and a hand-held police scanner in his car. The
patrolmen also noticed that respondent was recording the conversation. They arrested respondent for violation of the
Washington Privacy Act despite respondent’s claim that he
could by law record his conversation with the officers.
The patrolmen, after speaking with a state prosecutor,
charged respondent with violating the Act and issued a ticket
to respondent for his flashing lights. Under the law, “respondent could be detained on the latter offense only for the period
of time ‘reasonably necessary’ to issue a citation.” The state
trial court dismissed both charges and respondent then filed a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 “and a state cause
of action for unlawful arrest and imprisonment, both claims
resting upon the allegation that petitioners arrested him without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.” A divided panel for the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit determined that the patrolmen “could not

Footnotes
1. 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
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have had probable cause to arrest because they cited only the
Privacy Act charge” and tape recording the conversation was
not a crime. It rejected petitioner’s claim that probable cause
existed because respondent was impersonating a police officer
or obstructing law enforcement on the grounds that “those
offenses were not ‘closely related’ to the offense invoked by
Devenpeck as he took respondent into custody.”
The Court began its opinion by reciting the basic principles
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: “The Fourth
Amendment protects ‘the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.’” A warrantless arrest is considered reasonable if “there is probable cause to believe that a criminal
offense has been or is being committed.” Probable cause is
measured by “the reasonable conclusion[s] . . . drawn from the
facts known to the arresting officer at the time of arrest.” The
Court has made clear in prior decisions that “an arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.” It has repeatedly
explained that “the fact that the officer does not have the state
of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide
the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate
the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” The Court concluded “the rule that
the offense establishing probable cause must be ‘closely related’
to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense identified by
the arresting officer at the time of arrest is inconsistent with
this precedent.” This rule “makes the lawfulness of an arrest
turn upon the motivation of the arresting officer—eliminating,
as validating probable cause, facts that played no part in the
officer’s expressed subjective reason for making the arrest.”
Otherwise, the constitutionality of the arrest will “vary from
place to place and from time to time.” An arrest by a “veteran
officer would be valid, whereas an arrest made by a rookie in
precisely the same circumstances would not.”
Justice Stevens, writing for a 6-2 Court, held in Illinois v.
Caballes2 that a dog sniff during a routine traffic stop does not
violate the Fourth Amendment because it does not prolong the
stop, and does not implicate any legitimate privacy interest a
driver carrying contraband may have. Chief Justice Rehnquist
took no part in the decision.
Respondent was stopped by an Illinois state trooper for
traveling at 71 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h. zone. While the first state
trooper was in the process of issuing a warning ticket, a second
trooper arrived and walked his narcotics-detection dog around

2. 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005).

respondent’s car even though the first trooper had not reported
suspicion of drugs. The dog alerted the troopers and marijuana
was discovered in the trunk of respondent’s car. The entire
episode took less than ten minutes. Respondent was arrested
and convicted of a narcotics offense after the trial judge denied
his motion to suppress the marijuana. The appellate court
affirmed, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that “because the canine sniff was performed without any ‘specific and articulable facts’ to suggest drug activity, the use of
the dog ‘unjustifiably enlarge[ed] the scope of a routine traffic
stop into a drug investigation.’”
The Supreme Court reversed and based its opinion on the
following assumptions: (1) respondent was stopped solely for
a traffic violation and there was no suspicion that he possessed
marijuana; (2) the traffic stop, or initial seizure of respondent,
was based on probable cause and legitimate; and (3) even
though the initial stop was legitimate, the stop “can violate the
Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably
infringes interests protected by the Constitution.” The Court
also recognized the legitimacy of a prior Illinois Supreme
Court ruling that a search would be illegal where a routine traffic stop was prolonged beyond a reasonable time because of a
dog sniff. However, it finds that the stop in this case did not
exceed ten minutes, a time “justified by the traffic offense and
the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop.” The Court indicated that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision was erroneous
in this case because it determined that the state trooper unconstitutionally turned a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion that respondent possessed
any drugs. The Fourth Amendment, however, is violated only
when a search compromises a legitimate privacy interest. The
Court has previously determined that an individual does not
have any legitimate privacy interest in possessing contraband.
In keeping with this reasoning, the Court held in United States
v. Place,3 that “a ‘canine sniff’ by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog” is “sui generis,” in a class all itself because it “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband
item.” The Court concluded that a narcotics-detection dog that
only reveals the existence of contraband, and “‘does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden
from public view,’ during a lawful traffic stop, generally does
not implicate legitimate privacy interests.”
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court
in Muehler v. Mena,4 which held that the use of handcuffs to
detain an individual during the execution of a search warrant
for weapons and gang-affiliation paraphernalia is not an unreasonable use of force. No justices dissented, but Justice Stevens
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
During an investigation into a gang-related drive-by shooting, police obtained a search warrant. They used a Special
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team for the search because they
believed there was a “high degree of risk involved in searching
a house” given the gang affiliations. While the police executed
the warrant, respondent, among others, was placed and

remained in handcuffs at
The Fourth
gunpoint in a converted
Amendment . . .
garage during the entire
search. The police had also
is violated only
informed the Immigration
when a search
and Naturalization Service
compromises
a
(INS), and during the search,
an INS agent asked each legitimate privacy
occupant of the house for
interest.
their name, date and place of
birth, and immigration status.
The search yielded various weapons, some marijuana, and
gang paraphernalia.
Respondent filed an action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983
against the officers, claiming that “she was detained ‘for an
unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner’ in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.” A jury determined that the officers
had violated Mena’s Fourth Amendment right “by detaining
her both with force greater than that which was reasonable and
for a longer period than that which was reasonable.” The court
of appeals affirmed the judgment on two grounds: (1) that the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because “it was
objectively unreasonable to confine her in the converted
garage and keep her in handcuffs during the [entire] search”;
and (2) the questioning of Mena regarding her immigration
status was a separate Fourth Amendment violation. The
Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court began by citing to Michigan v. Summers,5 in
which it held “that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority ‘to detain the occupants of the
premises while a proper search is conducted.’” The Court
found these detentions “appropriate . . . because the character
of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and
because the justifications for detention are substantial.”
Applying Summers to this scenario, the Court concluded that
Mena’s detention for the duration of the search was “plainly
permissible.” The Court stated that “[i]nherent in Summers’
authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched
is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention.” The Court recognized that the use of handcuffs was
more of an intrusion than was recognized in Summers, but
believed that it was justified as “this was no ordinary search”
but an “inherently dangerous situation[,]” since the police
were searching for weapons and believed that gang members
were present on the property. The Court further concluded
that the amount of time Mena was in handcuffs was not unreasonable given the danger of the search.
Finally, the Court also believed Mena’s rights were not violated by the INS agent’s questioning while she was detained.
The Court disagreed with the lower court’s premise that the
police “were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question Mena concerning her immigration
status because the questioning constituted a discrete Fourth
Amendment event.” It stated: “We have ‘held repeatedly that

3. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
4. 125 S.Ct. 1465 (2005).

5. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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[A] trial court’s midtrial dismissal of a
charge . . . for lack
of evidence is final
and cannot be
reconsidered unless
there is a law in
place that allows for
such reconsideration.

mere police questioning
does not constitute a
seizure.’”
FIFTH AMENDMENT

A 5-4 Court, in Smith v.
Massachusetts,6 held that
under
the
Double
J e o p a rdy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, a trial
c o u rt ’s midtrial dismissal
of a charge against a
defendant for lack of evidence is final and cannot be re c o n s i d e red unless there is a law
in place that allows for such reconsideration. Petitioner
Melvin Smith was tried before a jury on three counts. At the
conclusion of the prosecution’s case, the court, on a motion
filed by petitioner, dismissed the third count on the gro u n d s
that “there was ‘not a scintilla of evidence’” to prove one element of the crime. After the close of defendant’s case but prior
to closing argument, the prosecution asked the judge to
reevaluate her decision dismissing the third count on the
grounds that a prior Massachusetts court decision had held
that the evidence he presented was sufficient. The judge
a g reed and reversed her decision. Petitioner was convicted on
all three counts.
Under the common law, “double jeopardy . . . applied only
to charges on which a jury had rendered a verdict.” However,
the Court has long since held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
“prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the
same extent it prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by jury
verdict.” The Court has recognized only a “single exception to
the principle that acquittal by judge precludes reexamination
of guilt no less than acquittal by jury.” This exception occurs
when “a jury returns a verdict of guilty and a trial judge (or an
appellate court) sets aside that verdict and enters a judgment
of acquittal.” In that case, the prosecution can appeal to reinstate the jury verdict. However, “if the prosecution has not yet
obtained a conviction, further proceedings to secure one are
impermissible.”
The Court believed that when the judge in this case dismissed the third count, the judge’s dismissal of the count was
in fact “a judgment of acquittal,” since no jury verdict had
been returned and further “factfinding proceedings going to
guilt or innocence” were prohibited. The Court rejected the
prosecution’s argument that double jeopardy did not attach
because the court’s decision was “purely a legal determination”
and that the “factfinding function” was reserved to the jury.
The Court previously rejected similar reasoning in United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.7 In Martin Linen, the Court
determined that an acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29 “is a substantive determination that the prosecution has failed to carry its burden[]” and thus, “even when the
jury is the primary factfinder, the trial judge still resolves ele-

6. 125 S.Ct. 1129 (2005).
7. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
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ments of the offense in granting a Rule 29 motion in the
absence of a jury verdict.”
The Court next addressed “whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause permitted [the judge] to reconsider that acquittal once
petitioner and his codefendant had rested their cases.” The
Court stated “that the facts of this case gave petitioner no reason to doubt the finality of the state court’s ruling.” The Court
recognized that “as a general matter state law may prescribe
that a judge’s midtrial determination of the sufficiency of the
State’s proof can be reconsidered.” However, it found no such
law in Massachusetts. The Court determined that “[i]t may
suffice for an appellate court to announce the state-law rule
that midtrial acquittals are tentative in a case where reconsideration of the acquittal occurred at a stage in the trial where the
defendant’s justifiable ignorance of the rule could not possibly
have caused him prejudice.” That was not the case here, however, because “the possibility of prejudice” arose. The defendant could have presented evidence to rebut the element, but
he ran the risk of bolstering the prosecution’s case.
A 7-2 Court, in an opinion written by Justice Breyer, determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the
use of visible shackles during the penalty phase of a capital
murder trial unless the use is justified by an essential state
interest. The petitioner in Deck v. Missouri8 was tried and convicted in state court for robbing and killing an elderly couple.
He was sentenced to death but the Missouri Supreme Court set
aside the sentence. During the new sentencing proceeding,
“Deck was shackled with leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly
chain.” His numerous objections to the shackles were overruled and the jury was aware that Deck was shackled during
the entire proceeding. Deck was again sentenced to death and
appealed again, claiming “that his shackling violated both
Missouri law and the Federal Constitution.” The Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed the sentence.
Under common law, “[t]he law has long forbidden routine
use of visible shackles during the guilt phase; it permits a State
to shackle a criminal defendant only in the presence of special
need.” The Court stated that more recently, it “has suggested
that a version of this rule forms part of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ due process guarantee.” The Court
took this opportunity to state with certainty that this rule identifies “a basic element of the ‘due process of law’ protected by
the Federal Constitution.” The Court recognized, however,
that the penalty phase of a trial might dictate a different rule
because “the reasons that motivate the guilt-phase constitutional rule . . . [may not] apply with similar force in this context.” The Court recognized “[j]udicial hostility to shackling
may once primarily have reflected concern for the suffering—
the ‘tortures’ and ‘torments’—that ‘very painful’ chains could
cause.” More recently, the Court has “emphasized the importance of giving effect to three fundamental legal principles”:
(1) the presumption of innocence; (2) the right to counsel and
a meaningful defense; and (3) the maintenance of a dignified
judicial process sought by judges.

8. 125 S.Ct. 2007 (2005).

The Court reasoned that the “considerations that militate
against the routine use of visible shackles during the guilt
phase of a criminal trial apply with like force to penalty proceedings in capital cases.” While the innocence phase of the
trial is concluded, and therefore the use of shackles has no
bearing on this consideration, “shackles at the penalty phase
threaten related concerns.” The jury is “deciding between life
and death,” which is a decision that has the same “severity”
and “finality” as guilt. According to the Court, a defendant in
shackles conveys to the jury “that court authorities consider
the offender a danger to the community[,]” and “inevitably
affects adversely the jury’s perception of the character of the
defendant.”
SIXTH AMENDMENT: COUNSEL

In Florida v. Nixon,9 the Court held that conceding guilt
during the first phase of a capital trial is not tantamount to
entering a guilty plea on behalf of the accused; therefore, counsel’s failure to obtain defendant’s express consent to such a
strategy does not automatically render counsel’s performance
deficient. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which all the justices joined, except Chief Justice Rehnquist
who took no part in the decision of the case.
Respondent Joe Elton Nixon was indicted for the brutal
murder of Jeanne Bickner. Assistant Public Defender Michael
Corin was assigned to Nixon and filed a plea of not guilty.
Corin deposed all the State’s witnesses and determined that
“Nixon’s guilt was not ‘subject to any reasonable dispute.’”
Corin commenced plea negotiations, which were unsuccessful,
and then decided to focus on the penalty phase of the trial,
“believing that the only way to save Nixon’s life would be to
present extensive mitigation evidence centering on Nixon’s
mental instability.” As an experienced attorney, Corin believed
that contesting Nixon’s guilt in the first phase of the trial
would compromise his ability to persuade the jury that Nixon’s
actions were a product of the mental illness. Corin attempted
to explain the situation to Nixon on three occasions. Nixon
generally was unresponsive and never approved or protested
the attorney’s strategy. In fact, Nixon showed little interest in
the trial and “intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to
be present at trial.” During the trial, Corin admitted Nixon’s
guilt and asked the jury to focus on the penalty phase of the
trial. He only questioned the State’s witnesses to the extent he
wanted to clarify their statements but did not present a
defense. During the penalty phase, Corin argued that Nixon
was mentally ill. The jury, however, recommended that Nixon
be given the death penalty.
After a direct appeal, Nixon sought state postconviction
relief arguing that Corin provided ineffective assistance of
counsel because he conceded “Nixon’s guilt without obtaining
Nixon’s express consent.” Relying on United States v. Cronic,10
Nixon argued that Corin’s actions were “presumed prejudicial
because it left the prosecution’s case unexposed to ‘meaningful
adversarial testing.’” The Court did not agree. It recognized the

9. 543 U.S. 175 (2004).
10.466 U.S. 648 (1984).

basic principle that “[a]n
[T]he “considerations
attorney . . . has a duty to
consult with the client that militate against
regarding ‘important decithe routine use of
sions,’ including questions
visible shackles
of overarching defense
during the guilt
strategy.” However, this
obligation
“does
not
phase . . . apply
require counsel to obtain
with like force to
the defendant’s consent to
‘every tactical decision.’” penalty proceedings
in capital cases.”
Some decisions that affect
basic rights cannot be
waived through a surrogate; for instance, the basic right to a
trial. By pleading guilty, “a defendant waives constitutional
rights that inhere in a criminal trial, including the right to trial
by jury, the protection against self-incrimination, and the right
to confront one’s accusers.” Therefore, while it may be tactically advantageous, an attorney may not make a guilty plea on
behalf of a client, and “a defendant’s tacit acquiescence in the
decision to plead is insufficient to render the plea valid.”
The Court determined that Corin’s concession of guilt was
not a “guilty plea” and did not “waive” Nixon’s rights in a
criminal trial. Therefore, Corin did not need explicit approval.
The Court rested its decision on the following facts. First, the
prosecution was still required to prove its case. Second, Corin
still could cross-examine witnesses and move to exclude prejudicial evidence, which he did. The Court also noted that, as
required, Corin did attempt to discuss his strategy with Nixon
on several occasions. The Court concluded “[g]iven Nixon’s
constant resistance to answering inquiries put to him by counsel and court . . . Corin was not additionally required to gain
express consent before conceding Nixon’s guilt.” According to
the Court, Corin fulfilled his duties. The Court recognized that
in a more standard trial, the decision might be closer. However,
in a death penalty case, counsel faces very different decisions,
“not least because the defendant’s guilt is often clear.” The
Court deemed it reasonable for counsel, therefore, “to focus on
the trial’s penalty phase, at which time counsel’s mission is to
persuade the trier that his client’s life should be spared.” When
defendant is “unresponsive” to counsel’s strategic discussions,
“counsel’s strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule
demanding the defendant’s explicit consent.”
A 5-4 Court, in Rompilla v. Beard,11 held that counsel provided ineffective assistance when it failed to review the files the
prosecutor stated it would use as evidence to prove aggravating factors in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, despite the
fact that defendant and his family indicated that no mitigating
evidence existed. Justice Souter wrote the opinion of the
Court, while Justice Kennedy dissented.
Petitioner Ronald Rompilla was found guilty of murder. In
the penalty phase of the proceedings, “the prosecutor sought
to prove three aggravating factors to justify a death sentence.”
Prior to trial, the prosecutor indicated that he would use the

11.125 S.Ct. 2456 (2005).
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files from Rompilla’s prior
convictions as evidence.
Despite that warning,
defense counsel did not
obtain a copy of the files
and, instead, merely questioned Rompilla and his
family about possible mitigating evidence. Rompilla
and his family members
indicated that there was
none. In reality, if defense
counsel had looked at the
file “they would have found
a range of mitigation leads
that no other source had
opened up.” The file included records of Rompilla’s childhood
and mental-health history, including test results that pointed to
schizophrenia and other disorders. The defense’s mitigating
evidence merely consisted of relatively brief testimony of
Rompilla’s family members, who argued in effect for residual
doubt and beseeched the jury for mercy, and three mentalhealth officials, who were consulted prior to trial. Rompilla
was sentenced to death.
After denial of relief in his state postconviction proceedings,
Rompilla sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The District
Court, applying the necessary standard under 28 U.S.C. section 2255, determined “that the State Supreme Court had
unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington12 as to the
penalty phase of the trial, and granted relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel.” A divided panel for the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.
The Supreme Court recognized that the standard of reasonableness in this scenario has “few hard-edged rules, and the
merits of a number of counsel’s choices in this case are subject
to fair debate.” While the Court recognized that defense counsel need not “scour the globe on the off-chance something will
turn up,” it also believed that there are certain lines of inquiry
which must be followed. It believed it is “clear and dispositive”
that counsel was “deficient in failing to examine the court file
on Rompilla’s prior conviction.” The Court gave the “obvious
reason” as “[c]ounsel knew that the Commonwealth intended
to seek the death penalty by proving Rompilla had a significant
history of felony convictions indicating the use or threat of violence.” It is clear from the record that counsel did not review
the transcripts from Rompilla’s prior convictions and that failure to examine them seriously compromised the opportunity
to respond to a case for aggravation.
The Court believed that it did not, as the dissent argued,
create a “‘rigid, per se’ rule that requires defense counsel to do
a complete review of the file on any prior conviction introduced.” It only requires counsel “to make reasonable efforts to
review the prior conviction file” if it knows that the prosecution intends to introduce it and will quote damaging testimony
from the victim. The Court stated: “Other situations, where a

defense lawyer is not charged with knowledge that the prosecutor intends to use a prior conviction in this way, might well
warrant a different assessment.” The Court also concluded,
examining the matter de novo, that counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial in this instance under the standard that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”
In Halbert v. Michigan,13 the Court considered the constitutionality of Michigan’s amendment to its Constitution: “In
every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right
. . . to have an appeal as a matter of right, except as provided
by law an appeal by an accused who pleads guilty or nolo contendere shall be by leave of the court.” Under this amendment,
“[a] defendant convicted by plea who seeks review in the
Michigan Court of Appeals must now file an application for
leave to appeal.” Further, a defendant who pleads guilty or
nolo contendere is not entitled to court-appointed appellate
counsel except by leave of court, grant of application for leave
to appeal, or in certain specific instances. Petitioner pleaded
nolo contendere to two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The day after he was sentenced, “Halbert submitted a handwritten motion to withdraw his plea.” The court
denied it stating “that Halbert’s ‘proper remedy is to appeal to
the Michigan Court of Appeals.’” Petitioner requested the aid
of counsel twice but the requests were denied. Petitioner then
filed a pro se application for leave to appeal, claiming a sentencing error and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court
of Appeals denied the application “for lack of merit in the
grounds presented.” The Michigan Supreme Court, in a
divided panel, “denied Halbert’s application for leave to appeal
to that court.”
A 6-3 Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, held
that an indigent defendant who has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere is entitled to the appointment of appellate counsel
when seeking access to a direct appeal. “The Federal
Constitution imposes on the States no obligation to provide
appellate review of criminal convictions.” However, once the
State has provided such an avenue it “may not ‘bolt the door to
equal justice’ to indigent defendants.” The Court believed this
case must be aligned with one of its two prior cases: Douglas v.
California14 or Ross v. Moffitt.15 In D o u g l a s, the Court held that
“in first appeals as of right, States must appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants.” In R o s s, the Court held “a State
need not appoint counsel to aid a poor person in discre t i o n a ry
appeals to the State’s highest court, or in petitioning for review
in this Court.” The Supreme Court stated that two considerations were key to its holding in D o u g l a s , which did not exist in
R o s s: (1) “such an appeal entails an adjudication on the ‘merits’”; and (2) “first-tier review differs from subsequent appellate
stages ‘at which the claims have once been presented by [appellate counsel] and passed upon by an appellate court.’” As to the
latter consideration, in second-tier discre t i o n a ry appeals:
[A] defendant who had already benefited from counsel’s aid in a first-tier appeal as of right would have, “at
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A 6-3 Court . . . held
that an indigent
defendant who has
pleaded guilty or
nolo contendere is
entitled to the
appointment of
appellate counsel
when seeking
access to a direct
appeal.
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the very least, a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals
setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an
opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case.”

In United States v. Booker,16 the Court held that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are subject to the jury requirement of
the Sixth Amendment. The Court also invalidated the provisions of the Guidelines that make them mandatory (18 U.S.C.
section 3553(b)(1)), and the accompanying appellate review
standard (18 U.S.C. section 3742(e)), stating that instead
courts should treat them as advisory. Justice Stevens delivered
the opinion of the Court as to the first holding and Justice
Breyer delivered the opinion as to the second. Based on the
Court’s prior decision in Blakely v. Washington,17 the lower
courts, in the companion cases of United States v. Booker and
United States v. Fanfan, rejected application of the Guidelines
“because the proposed sentences were based on additional facts
that the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence.” The judge sentenced respondent Booker to 30 years,
instead of the 21 years and 10 months that it could have sentenced Booker, solely based on the findings by the jury. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed based on the
Court’s decision in Blakely. With regard to respondent Fanfan,
the trial judge determined at a sentencing hearing that additional facts existed that authorized a sentence of 188 to 235
months. However, based on the Court’s decision in Blakely, the
trial judge sentenced Fanfan solely on the facts reflected in the

jury verdict. The Government
The Court . . .
appealed.
invalidated the
The Court began its opinion by restating the following
provisions of the
basic principles: (1) “the
Guidelines that
Constitution protects every
make them
criminal defendant ‘against
conviction except upon proof
mandatory and
beyond a reasonable doubt of the accompanying
every fact necessary to constiappellate review
tute a crime with which he is
standard . . . .
charged’”; and (2) a defendant has a “right to demand
that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime.” In
Apprendi v. New Jersey,18 the Court held “[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The
Court’s opinion was reaffirmed in Ring v. Arizona,19 where it
held that it was “impermissible for ‘the trial judge, sitting
alone’ to determine the presence or absence of the aggravating
factors required by Arizona law for imposition of the death
penalty.” And most recently, the Court, in Blakely, held that a
trial judge could not increase a sentence beyond the statutory
“standard” based on his finding of “deliberate cruelty,” even if
Washington law authorized the increased sentence for that
type of felony and the time to which the defendant was sentenced was still below the statutory “maximum.” The Court
determined that the “statutory maximum” for the purposes of
Apprendi is the maximum the judge can impose “solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.” According to the Court, the Guidelines, by their
own terms, are mandatory and “impose binding requirements
on all sentencing judges.” It concluded, therefore, that it runs
afoul of the Sixth Amendment since many of the factors that
mandate an increased sentence are not determined by the jury.
In the second part of its opinion, the Court found that there
are provisions within the Guidelines that make them “mandatory” and, therefore, incompatible with the Court’s holding
today. The Court believed, however, that instead of reading a
jury requirement into the Guidelines, it should instead strike
the provisions of the Guidelines making them mandatory (18
U.S.C. sections 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e)), leaving the
Guidelines “effectively advisory.” The Court supported its
decision by looking at the legislative history and concluded
that if its constitutional holding was “added onto the
Sentencing Act as currently written, the requirement would so
transform the scheme that Congress created that Congress
likely would not have intended the Act as so modified to
stand.” Second, the Court recognized that “Congress’ basic
statutory goal—a system that diminishes sentencing disparity—depends for its success upon judicial efforts to determine
. . .the real conduct that underlies the crime of conviction.”
According to the Court, it appeared that Congress would have
intended that this system continue and to allow the jury a role
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In the end, the Court believed “that Douglas provide[d] the
controlling instruction” because of “[t]wo aspects of the
Michigan Court of Appeals’ process following plea-based convictions”: (1) “in determining how to dispose of an application
for leave to appeal, Michigan’s intermediate appellate court
looks to the merits of the claims made in the application”; and
(2) “indigent defendants pursuing first-tier review in the Court
of Appeals are generally ill equipped to represent themselves.”
The Court believed “[o]f critical importance” is the fact that
“the tribunal to which he addresses his application, the
Michigan Court of Appeals” sits to correct errors in individual
cases. The court of appeals can respond to an application in
various ways, “[b]ut the court’s response to the leave application by any of the specified alternatives—including denial of
leave—necessarily entails some evaluation of the merits of the
applicant’s claims.” The Court also focused on Halbert’s specific
situation to support its conclusion. The Court believed that
“[n]avigating the appellate process without a lawyer’s assistance is a perilous endeavor for a layperson, and well beyond
the competence of individuals, like Halbert, who have little
education, learning disabilities, and mental impairments.” The
Court recognized Michigan’s legitimate interest in “reducing
the workload of its judiciary,” but believed providing “counsel
will yield applications [for leave to appeal] easier to comprehend.”
SIXTH AMENDMENT: JURY TRIAL
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in this “system” would
“ d e s t roy” Congre s s ’s intent.
Finally, the Court stated that if
the Guidelines were read to
include the Sixth Amendment
requirement, it “would create
a system far more complex
than Congress would have
intended.”
Justices Stevens, Scalia,
and Thomas agreed that the
Guidelines are subject to the
Sixth Amendment, but disagreed with the Court’s decision to excise only portions of
the Guidelines and make
them discretionary. Justice Stevens would “simply allow the
Government to continue doing what is has done since this
Court handed down Blakely—prove any fact that is required to
increase a defendant’s sentence . . . to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Justice Scalia believed that the Court essentially
has created a scheme that existed prior to the Guidelines enactment. He criticized the Court, however, for establishing an
“unreasonableness” standard for appellate re v i e w. Justice
Thomas agreed with Justice Stevens’ “proposed remedy and
much of his analysis,” but wrote separately because he disagreed with “[Justice Stevens’] restatement of the severability
principles and reliance on legislative history.”
Justice Breyer dissented from part of the Court’s opinion. He
wrote: “I find nothing in the Sixth Amendment that forbids a
sentencing judge to determine (as judges at sentencing have
traditionally determined) the manner or way in which the
offender carried out the crime of which he was convicted.” He
distinguished “sentencing facts” from facts that prove the “element of the crime” and believed that history does not “support
a ‘right to jury trial’” for the former.
In Johnson v. California,20 a second case this term concerning Batson v. Kentucky,21 an 8-1 Court invalidated a California
law requiring a defendant to make a prima facie showing that
it was “more likely than not” the prosecutor used discriminatory reasons to exercise a peremptory challenge, finding that
this test does not fall within the framework set forth in Batson.
Petitioner Jay Shawn Johnson, a black male, was convicted of
second-degree murder and assault resulting in death. The prosecutor used three of his twelve preemptory challenges to
remove all the remaining black prospective jurors, leaving a
jury that was entirely white. Petitioner objected twice during
the process, but both objections were overruled by the trial
court without asking the prosecutor to offer a reason. Instead,
the trial judge found that “petitioner had failed to establish a
prima facie case under the governing state precedent.”
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court determined that California’s test, as set forth in Wheeler, does not fit
within the framework of Batson. The Court enumerated three
steps in Batson “which together guide trial courts’ constitu-

tional review of peremptory strikes”: (1) “the defendant must
make out a prima facie case ‘by showing that the totality of the
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose’”; (2) once a prima facie showing is made, the State must
“‘explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes”; and (3) finally,
“‘ the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of
the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’” In this
case, the question is “whether Batson permits California to
require at step one that ‘the objector must show that it is more
likely than not the other party’s peremptory challenges, if
unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias.’”
The Court began with Batson and concluded that Batson
itself does not support California’s rule. In Batson, the Court
held “that a prima facie case of discrimination can be made out
by offering a wide variety of evidence, so long as the sum of the
proffered facts gives ‘rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’” The Court stated that “in describing the burden-shifting framework, we assumed in Batson that the trial judge
would have the benefit of all relevant circumstances . . . before
deciding whether it was more likely than not that the challenge
was improperly motivated.” The Court:
did not intend the first step to be so onerous that a
defendant would have to persuade the judge—on the
basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for
the defendant to know with certainty—that the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.
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The first step of Batson only requires a defendant to produce
“sufficient” evidence “to permit the trial judge to draw an
inference that discrimination has occurred.”
Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter, argued that in Batson,
the Court said that states “have flexibility in formulating
appropriate procedures to comply.” He criticized the Court for
now telling “California how to comply with ‘the prima facie
inquiry mandated by Batson.’”
In an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, a unanimous
Court held in Bradshaw v. Stumpf22 that a prosecutor’s inconsistent arguments at a co-defendant’s trial about who was the trigg e rman in an aggravated murder charge did not render a defendant’s guilty plea unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent. As
part of a plea agreement for respondent’s participation in the
robbery, murder, and attempted murder of a husband and wife,
respondent agreed to plead guilty to aggravated murder and
attempted aggravated murd e r. The State, in re t u rn, agreed to
drop most of the other charges. With respect to the aggravated
murder charge, respondent agreed to plead guilty to “one of the
three capital specifications, with the State dropping the other
two.” This meant that respondent was still eligible for the death
penalty. At the penalty hearing, respondent’s primary argument,
however, “was that he had participated in the plot only at the
urging and under the influence of Wesley [his co-conspirator],
that it was Wesley who had fired the fatal shots . . . and that
Stumpf’s assertedly minor role in the murder counseled against

the death sentence.” The State argued that Stumpf was the principal offender and he was sentenced to death.
At Wesley’s trial, the prosecutor introduced the testimony of
Wesley’s cellmate, who testified that Wesley had admitted to
firing the shots that killed Mary Jane Stout. Wesley took the
stand in his own defense and “testified that Stumpf had shot
Mrs. Stout.” Wesley was sentenced “to life imprisonment with
the possibility of parole after 20 years.” After Wesley’s trial,
“Stumpf, whose direct appeal was still pending in the Ohio
Court of Appeals, returned to the Court of Common Pleas with
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or vacate his death sentence.” He argued that the prosecutor’s argument and evidence
that Wesley shot Mrs. Stout “cast doubt on Stumpf’s conviction
and sentence.” The prosecutor claimed that the cellmate’s testimony “was belied by certain other evidence (ballistics evidence and Wesley’s testimony in his own defense) confirming
Stumpf to have been the primary shooter.” These arguments
were in direct conflict with his arguments at Wesley’s trial.
After Stumpf exhausted his state remedies, he filed a federal
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising the same claim.
The Sixth Circuit reversed on two grounds: (1) “Stumpf’s
guilty plea was invalid because it had not been entered knowingly and intelligently” because “Stumpf had pleaded guilty to
aggravated murder without understanding that specific intent
to cause death was a necessary element of the charge under
Ohio law”; and (2) “Stumpf’s due process rights were violated
by the state’s deliberate action in securing convictions of both
Stumpf and Wesley for the same crime, using inconsistent theories.”
The Court disagreed. Precedent has established that “[a]
guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid
only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, ‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’” However, the record reflects that Stumpf’s attorneys “represented . . . that they had explained to their client
the elements of the aggravated murder charge; Stumpf himself
then confirmed that this representation was true.” The Court
has never held that the trial court must explain the elements
on the record. The Court also rejected Stumpf’s arguments that
it was clear he did not understand the specific intent element
of the crime because he maintained throughout “his denial of
having shot the victim.” Ohio law does not require that Stumpf
himself shoot Mrs. Stout because “aiders and abettors [are]
equally in violation of the aggravated murder statute, so long
as the aiding and abetting is done with the specific intent to
cause death.” According to the Court, “Stumpf has never provided an explanation of how the prosecution’s post-plea use of
inconsistent arguments could have affected the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of his plea.” The Court did recognize that “[t]he prosecutor’s use of allegedly inconsistent
theories may have a more direct effect on Stumpf’s sentence
. . . for it is at least arguable that the sentencing panel’s conclusion about Stumpf’s principal role in the offense was material to its sentencing determination.” However, it is not clear if

the lower court “would
have concluded that
Stumpf was entitled to
resentencing had the
court not also considered
the conviction invalid.”
T h e re f o re, the Court
expressed no opinion as
to this matter and
remanded the case.
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EIGHTH AMENDMENT

In a 5-4 opinion . . .
the Court held that
the Eighth and
Fourteenth
Amendments forbid
the death penalty
for offenders who
were under . . . 18
when they committed
the crime.

In a 5-4 opinion in
Roper v. Simmons,23 the
Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the death penalty for offenders who were under the age of
18 when they committed the crime. Justice Kennedy delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas dissented.
Respondent Christopher Simmons committed murder at
the age of 17, and was tried after he had turned 18. There “is
little doubt” that Simmons committed the murder. He was
tried as an adult because he was 17 and outside the criminal
jurisdiction of Missouri’s juvenile court system. During the
sentencing phase of the trial, the jury was instructed they
could use age as a mitigating factor to the death penalty.
However, Simmons was sentenced to death. After this case had
run its course in the state court system, the Court decided
Atkins v. Virginia,24 which held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the execution of mentally disabled persons. Simmons then filed a new petition for state postconviction relief, “arguing that the reasoning of Atkins established
that the Constitution prohibits the execution of a juvenile who
was under 18 when the crime was committed.” The Missouri
Supreme Court agreed and set aside Simmons’ death sentence.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
To reach its decision, the Court followed a line of its precedent. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,25 a plurality of the Court
determined that “our standards of decency do not permit the
execution of any offender under the age of 16 at the time of the
crime.” The plurality stressed that “the reasons why juveniles
are not trusted with the privileges and responsibility of an
adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” The following year,
in Stanford v. Kentucky,26 the Court “concluded the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments did not proscribe the execution of
juvenile offenders over 15 but under 18.” The Court believed
that ‘there was no national consensus ‘sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual.’” That same day, the
Court also decided Penry v. Lynaugh,27 and held that there was
no “categorical exemption from the death penalty for the mentally retarded.” Three years ago, the Court reconsidered its
Penry decision in Atkins. It held that “standards of decency
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have evolved . . . and now
demonstrate that the execution of the mentally
retarded is cruel and
unusual punishment.” The
Atkins Court “returned to
the rule, established in
decisions
pre d a t i n g
Stanford,
that
‘the
Constitution contemplates that in the end . . . [the Court’s]
own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment.’” In this case, the Court reconsidered the decision in Stanford and wrote that to do so it will apply the following factors: (1) state consensus and practice and (2) its
own independent judgment.
The Court stated that the evidence of the “national consensus” for the death penalty for juveniles is similar to that for
mentally disabled. Essentially, its prohibition among the States
is increasing and its use is decreasing. The Court concluded
that the majority of States have prohibited the imposition of
the death penalty for juveniles under the age of 18, “and . . .
now holds this is required by the Eighth Amendment.” There
are “[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18
and adults . . .[that] demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders”:
(1) there is “a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility.”; (2) juveniles are more susceptible to “negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and
(3) “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of
an adult.” These differences “render suspect any conclusion
that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.” The Court
also stated that “[o]nce the diminished culpability of juveniles
is recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications
for the death penalty [retribution and deterrence] apply to
them with lesser force than to adults.” The Court did not overlook “the brutal crimes too many juvenile offenders have committed[,]” and recognized that in some cases a juvenile might
have sufficient psychological maturity to merit the sentence of
death. However, the Court believed that “a line must be
drawn” somewhere.
In the last part of its opinion, the Court reinforced its decision based upon its views and its “task of interpreting the
Eighth Amendment.” Citing numerous facts, the Court concluded “that the United States is the only country in the world
that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty.” The Court believed it “proper that we acknowledge
the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the
juvenile death penalty.”
Justices O’Connor and Scalia wrote dissenting opinions.
Justice O’Connor found no evidence of a “national consensus”
to categorically exclude the execution of individuals under the
age of 18, “no matter how deliberate, wanton, or cruel the
offense.” Justice Scalia wrote separately about “the mockery”
today’s decision has on the traditional role of the judiciary by

“announcing the Court’s conclusion that the meaning of our
Constitution has changed over the past 15 years.” He also criticized the Court for proclaiming “itself sole arbiter of our
Nation’s moral standards.” Finally, in reference to the Court’s
reliance on international law, he wrote, “Though the views of
our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision today, the views of other countries and the so-called international community take center stage.”
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Justice Scalia . . .
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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of a 5-3 Court in
Johnson v. California,28 in which the Court held that the proper
s t a n d a rd of review for the California Department of
Correction’s (CDC) policy separating new or newly transferred
inmates by race is strict scrutiny. The CDC houses all new
inmates and inmates transferred from other state facilities in
“reception centers” for up to 60 days. Double-cell assignments
in the reception centers are predominantly based on race. The
CDC justifies its actions on the grounds “that it is necessary to
prevent violence caused by racial gangs.” The rest of the facility’s areas are fully integrated. Petitioner Garrison Johnson is
an African-American inmate who has been incarcerated since
1987 and has been in many prison facilities. Each time he is
transferred, he is held at a reception center and double-celled
with another African-American. He filed a pro se complaint in
the district court “alleging that the CDC’s reception-center
housing policy violated his right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment by assigning him cellmates on the
basis of race.”
The Court began its analysis with its holding in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,29 in which it held that “all racial classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be analyzed by
a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” Under this standard,
“the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications ‘are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.’” The purpose behind this policy is
that “[r]acial classifications raise special fears that they are
motivated by an invidious purpose.” The CDC argued “that its
policy should be exempt . . . because it is ‘neutral’—that is, it
‘neither benefits nor burdens one group or individual more
than any other group or individual.’” The Court stated that it
rejected a similar argument—that separate could be equal—in
Brown v. Board of Education.30 It refused to change its opinion
today.
The Court believed the need for strict scrutiny is as important here as in its other cases despite the argument that the policy is necessary to control racial violence: “racial classifications
‘threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility.’” The Court
stated that “[v]irtually all other States and the Federal
Government manage their prison systems without reliance on
racial segregation.” The CDC has not made it clear why it, like
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, cannot address prison security
issues on individual bases. The Court continued by stating that
“[i]n the prison context, when the government’s power is at its

apex, we think that searching judicial review of racial classifications is necessary to guard against invidious discrimination.”
The Court rejected the CDC’s argument that “[d]eference to
the particular expertise of prison officials in the difficult task
of managing daily prison operations’ requires a more relaxed
standard of review.” It hasn’t seen the need in other circumstances and won’t here. The Court concluded its opinion by
stating that its decision does not necessarily preclude a policy
that is based on race, rejecting the argument that “[s]trict
scrutiny is . . . ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” Prison officials still have the opportunity to show a compelling interest
and a narrowly tailored policy to reach that end. It remanded
the case for a determination of whether the CDC policy survives strict scrutiny.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of a unanimous
Court in Wilkinson v. Austin,31 which held that the procedures
set forth in Ohio’s New Policy are sufficient to protect an
inmate’s procedural due-process rights when he is being considered for placement in Ohio’s Supermax security prison
(OSP). Supermax prisons are the highest security prisons. In
OSP, inmates are confined for 23 hours a day, their cells are lit
at all times though sometimes dimmed, there is no contact
between inmates in different cells, and meals are solitary.
According to the Court, “[i]t is fair to say OSP inmates are
deprived of almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and
of almost all human contact.” The New Policy was implemented in 2002 to provide “more guidance . . . [and] more procedural protection against erroneous placement in OSP.” The
procedures are summarized as follows: (1) a prison official
completes a three-page form called a “Security Designation
Long Form”; (2) “[a] three-member Classification Committee
(Committee) convenes to review the proposed classification
and to hold a hearing”; (3) at least 48 hours prior to the hearing, the inmate is provided with written notice detailing the
charges and can also request a copy of the Long Form; and (4)
the inmate may attend the hearing and defend himself or provide a written statement but cannot call witnesses. If the committee determines that the inmate should not be put in OSP,
the inquiry ends. If it decides otherwise, it documents its decision and sends the report to the warden of the prison in which
the inmate is being held. If the warden disagrees with the classification, the matter is ended. If he agrees, “he indicates his
approval” and forwards the annotated report to the Bureau of
Classification (Bureau). The inmate also receives a copy and
has 15 days to file his objection with the Bureau. The Bureau
reviews the report and makes a final determination. If it agrees
with the recommendation, the inmate is transferred and the
report is annotated again with the Bureau’s reasons. The inmate
receives another automatic review of his file by an OSP staff
member within 30 days of his transfer. His file is reviewed
yearly.
Prior to the implementation of the New Policy, a group of
OSP inmates brought suit against various prison officials under
42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging “that Ohio’s Old Policy . . .
violated due process. . . . On the eve of trial Ohio promulgated

its New Policy.” Both the
The Supreme Court
district court and the court
agreed with the
of appeals “evaluated the
adequacy of the New
lower courts that
Policy.” The district court
inmates have a
issued a detailed remedial
liberty
interest in
order based on its determination that “the inmates avoiding assignment
have a liberty interest in to [Ohio’s supermax
avoiding assignment to
security prison].
OSP.” The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circ u i t
affirmed this finding and the district court’s “procedural modifications” of the New Policy. However, “it set aside the
[d]istrict [c]ourt’s far-reaching substantive modifications, concluding they exceeded the scope of the [court’s] authority.”
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that
inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property.”
A “liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself . . . or
it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state
laws or policies.” The Court has already held that “the
Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in
avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.”
However, the Court has also held that this liberty interest “may
arise from state policies or regulations, subject to the important limitations set forth in Sandin v. Conner.”32 In Sandin, the
Court “abrogated the methodology of parsing the language of
particular regulations[]” to identify state-created liberty interests and returned to the “real concerns undergirding the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.” Thus, “the touchstone
of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created
liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of the regulations regarding those
conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” The Court
has not, and stated that it will not, identify “the baseline from
which to measure what is atypical and significant in any particular prison’s system[]” because it is clear that “under any
plausible baseline[,]” assignment in OSP imposes an atypical
and significant hardship.
The Court next turned to the question of what process then
is due to the inmates to protect their liberty interest. “Because
the requirements of due process are ‘flexible and call for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands,’ we
generally have declined to establish rigid rules and instead
have embraced a framework to evaluate the sufficiency of particular pro c e d u res.” The Court re f e rred to Mathews v.
Eldridge,33 where it identified three distinct factors for consideration: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedures safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
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function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” The
Court believed that although
inmates have an interest in
avoiding confinement in OSP,
the “procedural protections to
which they are entitled are
more limited than in cases
where the right at stake is the right to be free from confinement
at all.” The Court concluded that the procedures in place are
sufficient to protect again erroneous deprivation of the inmates’
liberty interest. Inmates are entitled to “notice of the factual
basis leading to consideration for OSP placement and a fair
opportunity for rebuttal[]” in two instances during the entire
process. Further, if at any point “one reviewer declines to recommend OSP placement, the process terminates.”

In a 5-3 decision
. . ., the Court held
that the word
“any” as used in
the statute does
not include foreign
courts.

CRIMINAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

In Whitfield v. United States,34 the Court interpreted 18
U.S.C. section 1985(h) of the federal money-laundering
statute, which provides: “Any person who conspires to commit
any offense defined in [§ 1956] or section 1957 shall be subject
to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the
commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.” A
unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Justice O’Connor,
held that conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering under section 1956(h) does not require proof of an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Petitioner and other codefendants were charged under section 1985(h) in connection
with a fraudulent investment scheme. The indictment only
described in “general terms” the “manner and means” used to
accomplish the objects of the conspiracy and “did not charge
the defendants with the commission of any overt act in furtherance thereof.” Petitioners asked the trial court to instruct
the jury that it must find “beyond a reasonable doubt that at
least one of the co-conspirators had committed an overt act in
furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy.” The court
denied the request. Petitioners were found guilty and appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the conviction. It determined that the jury instructions were proper
“because § 1956(h) does not require proof of an overt act.” The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the
Circuits.
According to the Court, the language of the statute shows
that Congress did not intend that proof of an overt act was necessary for a conviction. Its interpretation relied primarily on
United States v. Shabani,35 a case in which it interpreted similar
language in a drug-conspiracy statute. In Shabani, the Court
relied on its previous decisions in Nash v. United States36 and
Stinger v. United States,37 and held the statute did not require
proof of any further act: “where Congress had omitted from the
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relevant conspiracy provision any language expressly requiring
an overt act, the Court would not read such a requirement into
the statute.” Basic principles of statutory interpretation dictate
that “absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt
the common law definition of statutory terms.” The Court has
continually stated that the common-law understanding of conspiracy “does not make the doing of any act other than the act
of conspiring a condition of liability.”
The Court interpreted the use of the word “any” in two different statutes this term. In Small v. United States,38 the Court
interpreted “any” as it is used in the federal unlawful gun-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. section 922 (g)(1). Section 922(g)(1)
makes it “unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted
in any court . . . to . . . possess . . . any firearm.” Petitioner Gary
Small was convicted in a Japanese court for having tried to
smuggle firearms and ammunition into Japan. When Small
returned to the United States, he purchased a firearm. The federal government charged Small for “unlawful gun possession”
under section 922(g)(1). Small pled guilty to the charge but
reserved his right to challenge his conviction based on the fact
that his prior conviction fell outside the scope of the statute
because it was a foreign conviction. The District Court and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit both
rejected Small’s argument that “any” court did not refer to foreign courts.
In a 5-3 decision, written by Justice Breyer, the Court held
that the word “any” as used in the statute does not include foreign courts. The Court began by stating that “[t]he word ‘any’
considered alone cannot answer this question” because “[i]n
ordinary life, a speaker who says, ‘I’ll see any film,’ may or may
not mean to include films shown in another city.” Similarly,
“[i]n law, a legislature that uses the statutory phrase ‘any person’ may or may not mean to include a “persons’ outside ‘the
jurisdiction of the state.’” Instead, the Court must draw the
meaning of “any” from the legislative use of the word. The
Court first recognized that there is a “commonsense notion that
Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”
Therefore, the Court has adopted “the legal presumption that
Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not
extraterritorial, application.” This presumption would result in
prohibiting unlawful gun possession domestically, not internationally. The Court believed a “similar assumption is appropriate when we consider the scope of the phrase ‘convicted in any
court.’”
To support the application of this presumption, the Court
stated that “as a group, foreign convictions differ from domestic convictions in important ways”: (1) “foreign convictions
. . . may include a conviction for conduct that domestic laws
would permit.”; (2) they might “include a conviction from a
legal system that is inconsistent with an American understanding of fairness”; and (3) “they would include a conviction for
conduct that domestic law punishes far less severe l y.”
Therefore, the Court believed that “the key statutory phrase
‘convicted in any court . . .’ somewhat less reliably identifies
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dangerous individuals for the purposes of U.S. law where foreign convictions, rather than domestic convictions, are at
issue.” The Court also believed that “it is difficult to read the
statute as asking judges or prosecutors to refine its definitional
distinctions where foreign convictions are at issue.” The
statute does not require courts or prosecutors to “weed out”
inappropriate foreign convictions, nor does the Court believe
courts and prosecutors are capable of doing this. Finally, the
Court concluded the language of the statute “does not suggest
any intent to reach beyond domestic convictions.” In fact, the
Court believed that if the statute applied to foreign conviction,
“the statute’s language creates anomalies.” It gave five examples
drawn specifically from the express language of the statute. For
instance, the statute specifically provides an exception if a person has been convicted of federal or state antitrust or regulatory offenses. It does not provide an exception, however, if a
person has been convicted of a foreign antitrust or regulatory
offense.
Justice Thomas, writing a dissenting opinion, conceded that
the phrase “‘any court,’ like all other statutory language, must
be read in context.” However, he does not believe section
922(g)(1) suggests a “geographic limit on the scope of ‘any
court,’” whereas, in contrast, “other parts of the firearms-control law” do. Justice Thomas concluded his dissent by stating:
“The Court never convincingly explains its departure from the
natural meaning of § 922 (g)(1).” He found that instead, the
Court “institutes the troubling rule that ‘any’ does not really
mean ‘any,’ but may mean ‘some subset of “any,”’ even if nothing in the context so indicates.”
In Pasquantino v. United States,39 the Court interpreted the
word “any” as used in the federal wire-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
section 1343. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Thomas, the
Court held that a scheme to defraud a foreign government of
tax revenues qualifies as “any scheme” under the federal wirefraud statute. Petitioners were “indicted for and convicted of
federal wire fraud for carrying out a scheme to smuggle large
quantities of liquor into Canada from the United States.”
Petitioners ordered liquor from a discount store over the telephone and drove it into Canada without declaring it. The purpose was to avoid Canadian taxes, which were almost double
the liquor’s purchase price. Prior to trial, petitioners moved to
have the charges against them dropped on the grounds “that it
stated no wire fraud offense.” Section 1343 “prohibits the use
of interstate wires to effect ‘any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, re p resentations, or promises.’” Petitioners
claimed “that the Government lacked sufficient interest in
enforcing the revenue laws of Canada, and therefore that they
had not committed wire fraud.” The district court rejected the
petitioners’ argument and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, on a rehearing en banc, affirmed.
The Court stated that two elements of the crime are in dispute: (1) whether petitioners engaged in any “scheme or artifice to defraud”; and (2) whether “the ‘object of the fraud . . .
be ‘[money or] property’ in the victim’s hands.” In its opinion,

the Court addressed the secIn a 5-4 decision
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under the federal
stands for the proposition
that domestic courts are pro- wire-fraud statute.
hibited from enforcing the
collection of tax obligations of foreign nations. Petitioners
argued that “to avoid reading § 1343 to derogate from the common-law revenue rule, we should construe the otherwiseapplicable language of the wire fraud statute to except frauds
directed at evading foreign taxes.” The Court wrote that at the
time the wire-fraud statute was enacted, there was no “wellestablished revenue rule principle” at common law. Instead,
courts “treated the common-law revenue rule as a corollary of
the rule that . . . ‘[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another.’” It stated: “The basis for inferring the revenue
rule from the rule against foreign penal enforcement was an
analogy between foreign revenue laws and penal laws.” Various
courts first drew this inference “in a line of cases prohibiting
the enforcement of tax liabilities of one sovereign in the courts
of another sovereign.”
The Court believed that “[t]he revenue rule’s grounding in
these cases shows that, at its core, it prohibited the collection
of tax obligations of foreign nations.” The Court recognized
that this case is unlike the “classic examples of actions traditionally barred by the revenue rule[]” and believed that the revenue rule jurisprudence is not a clear bar to this prosecution.
The Court stated: “A prohibition on the enforcement of foreign
penal law does not plainly prevent the Government from
enforcing a domestic criminal law.” Further, petitioners did not
cite to any case that “barred an action that had as its primary
object the deterrence and punishment of fraudulent conduct—
a substantial domestic regulatory interest entirely independent
of foreign tax enforcement.” The Court believed that “the wire
fraud statute advances the Federal Government’s independent
interest in punishing fraudulent domestic criminal conduct, a
significant feature absent from all of petitioners’ revenue rule
cases.” The Court recognized that enforcement of the criminal
statute will “in an attenuated sense” enforce the Canadian revenue law. However, the revenue rule has “never proscribed all
enforcement of foreign revenue law.”
In a per curiam opinion, the Court, in Medellin v. Dretke,40
after a proclamation issued by the president that the United
States would “discharge its international obligations” under the
Vienna Convention, dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, stating that petitioner must pursue his rights
via state court. Jose Ernesto Medellin, a Mexican national,
“confessed to participating in the gang rape and murder of two
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girls in 1993.” He was convicted and sentenced to
death in a Texas state court.
Medellin filed a state habeas
petition, “claiming for the
first time that Texas failed to
notify him of his right to
consular access as required
by the Vienna Convention.”
The state court rejected this
argument and the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed. Subsequently, Medellin filed a federal habeas petition.
The District Court denied the petition. While the petition was
pending before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) “issued its decision in Case
Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals . . . in which the
Republic of Mexico had alleged violations of the Vienna
Convention with respect to Medellin and other Mexican
nationals facing the death penalty in the United States.” The
ICJ “determined that the Vienna Convention guaranteed individually enforceable rights, that the United States had violated
those rights, and that the United States must ‘provide, by means
of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the [affected] Mexican nationals . . . .’”
The Fifth Circuit “denied Medellin’s application for a certificate
of appealability[,]” based on “its prior holdings that the Vienna
Convention did not create an individually enforceable right.”
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. While the writ of certiorari was pending, President George W. Bush “issued a memorandum that stated the United States would discharge its
international obligations under the Avena judgment.” Medellin
relied on this memorandum as “separate bases for relief that
were not available at the time of his first state habeas action . .
. [and filed a] successive state application for a writ of habeas
corpus just four days before oral argument [here].” The Court
stated that “[t]his new development, as well as the factors discussed below, leads us to dismiss the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.”
The Court offered additional reasons for its holding:
First . . . [i]n Reed v. Farley,41 this Court recognized that
a violation of federal statutory rights ranked among the
“nonconstitutional lapses we have held not cognizable
in a postconviction proceeding” unless they meet the
“fundamental defect” test announced in our decision in
Hill v. United States. . . .42 Second, with respect to any
claim the state court “adjudicated on the merits,” habeas
relief in federal court is available only if such adjudication “was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court. . . .” Third, a habeas corpus petitioner
cannot enforce a “new rule” of law. . . . Fourth, Medellin
requires a certificate of appealability in order to pursue
the merits of his claim . . . which may be granted only
where there is “a substantial showing of the denial of a
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constitutional right. . . .” [And] [f]ifth, Medellin can seek
federal habeas relief only on claims that have been
exhausted in state court.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court in
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States,43 held that “corrupt persuasion,” as used in 18 U.S.C. section 1512(b)(2)(A), requires
consciousness of wrongdoing. This case stemmed from the
Securities Exchange Commission’s investigation of Enron’s
activities during the 1990s and through 2001. At that time,
petitioner Arthur Andersen LLP “audited Enron’s publicly filed
financial statements and provided internal audit and consulting
services.” In August 2001, the SEC opened an informal investigation into Enron’s accounting activities. The SEC did not open
a formal investigation until October 30, 2001, and did not serve
subpoenas on Arthur Anderson until November 9. Until that
time, various meetings were held between the top people at
Arthur Andersen and memoranda were sent among the “Enron
engagement team” urging “everyone to comply with the firm’s
document retention policy[,]” even if it meant destroying
documents that would clearly be relevant to any SEC investigation and any potential litigation. In fact, the document
destruction didn’t stop until November 9, when the head of the
engagement team sent a memorandum to the team stating “No
more shredding . . . . We have been officially served for our documents.” Arthur Andersen then was indicted for corruptly persuading another to withhold documents in the investigation:
In March 2002, petitioner was indicted in the Southern
District of Texas on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. §§
1512(b)(2)(A) and (B). These sections make it a crime to
“knowingly use intimidation or physical force, threaten,
or corruptly persuade another person . . . with intent to
. . . cause” that person to “withhold” documents from, or
“alter” documents for use in, an “official proceeding.”
The District Court relied on a Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury
Instruction to define “corruptly,” which defined it as “‘knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or
undermine the integrity’ of a proceeding.” However, complying
with the Government’s request, the District Court changed the
word “dishonestly” to “impede.” The jury eventually returned
a guilty verdict and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.
In its opinion, the Court focused on “what it means to
‘knowingly . . . corruptly persuade.’” The Court believed that
the word “knowingly” is as important as the word “corruptly”
because the statute “punishes not just ‘corruptly persuading’
another, but ‘knowingly . . . corruptly persuading’ another.”
The Court wrote that “the natural meaning of these terms provides a clear answer[]” to interpretation of the statute: (1)
“‘Knowledge’ and ‘knowingly’ are normally associated with
awareness, understanding, or consciousness”; (2) “‘[c]orrupt’
and ‘corruptly’ are normally associated with wrongful,
immoral, depraved, or evil”; and (3) “[j]oining these meanings
together here makes sense both linguistically and in the statu-
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tory scheme.” The Court concluded that “[o]nly persons conscious of wrongdoing can be said to ‘knowingly . . . corruptly
persuade.’” The Court believed that “[t]he outer limits of this
element need not be explored here because the jury instructions at issue simply failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing.” As modified, “[n]o longer was any type of
‘dishonesty’ necessary to a finding of guilt, and it was enough
for petitioner to have simply ‘impeded’ the Government’s
factfinding ability.” The instructions were also wrong because
“[t]hey led the jury to believe that it did not have to find any
nexus between the ‘persuasion’ to destroy documents and any
particular proceeding.”
CRIMINAL APPELLATE PROCEDURE

In Bell v. Thompson,44 the Court held that even if Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(b) authorized a stay of mandate
by the circuit court following the denial of a writ of certiorari
and even if an appellate court could stay the mandate without
entering an order, a delay of five months is an abuse of discretion. In 1985, respondent Gregory Thompson was sentenced to
death for the abduction and murder of a woman. After exhausting his state remedies, Thompson raised a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel in a federal habeas petition. He presented
evidence from a psychologist, Dr. Faye Sultan, who examined
him 13 years after the offense and who “contended that
Thompson’s symptoms indicated he was ‘suffering serious
mental illnesses at the time of the 1985 offense.’” The District
Court dismissed the petition. While appeal was pending in the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Thompson “filed a
motion in the District Court under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) requesting that the court supplement the
record with Sultan’s expert report and deposition[,]” which he
claimed was erroneously omitted. He also filed a motion with
the Sixth Circuit to hold the appeal in abeyance. Both the
District Court and the Sixth Circuit denied his motions. The
Sixth Circuit aff i rmed the dismissal of the petition. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Thompson then filed a
motion with the Sixth Circuit “seeking to extend the stay of
mandate pending disposition of his petition for rehearing.” in
the Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion.
The Supreme Court denied rehearing; however, the Sixth
Circuit did not issue its mandate pursuant to Rule 41(b).
Meanwhile, the Tennessee Supreme Court set the execution.
“From Febru a ry to June 2004, there were proceedings in both
state and federal courts related to Thompson’s present competency to be executed.” On June 23, 2004, the Sixth Circuit
“issued an amended opinion in Thompson’s initial federal
habeas case[,]” which vacated the district court ’s dismissal and
“remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on Thompson’s
i n e ffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.” The Sixth Circuit
“relied on its equitable powers to supplement the record on
appeal with Dr. Sultan’s 1999 deposition after finding that it was
‘apparently negligently omitted’ and ‘probative of Thompson’s
mental state at the time of the crime.’” The court “explained its
authority to issue an amended opinion five months after this
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Court denied a petition for rehearing: ‘We rely on our inherent
power to reconsider our opinion prior to the issuance of the
mandate, which has not yet issued in this case.’”
A 5-4 Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy,
reversed. According to Rule 41(b), once a petition for writ of
certiorari is denied, “[t]he court of appeals must issue the mandate immediately.” The Court did not answer whether the Rule
“authorizes a stay of the mandate following the denial of certiorari.” with or without an order. Instead it finds that even if it
could issue such a stay, “the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in doing so” by waiting five months. A court speaks
through its judgments and orders. “Without a formal docket
entry neither the parties nor this Court had, or have, any way
to know whether the court had stayed the mandate or simply
made a clerical mistake.” It states that in Calderon v.
Thompson,45 it “held that federalism concerns, arising from the
unique character of federal habeas review of state-court judgments, and the policies embodied in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 required an additional presumption against recalling the mandate.” These “finality and
comity concerns” are implicated in this case regardless of
whether “a dedicated judge discovered what he believed to
have been an error.”
Justice Breyer dissented, claiming that this case presented a
set of unusual “circumstances of a kind that I have previously
experienced in the 25 years I have served on the federal bench.”
He focused on the fact that a judge discovered an error and
sought to correct that error because it “could affect the outcome
of what is, and has always been, the major issue in the case.” He
believed it is not an abuse of discretion to “‘correct a decision
that it perceived to have been mistaken.’” He believed this case
presents three questions: (1) a legal question—whether the
court of appeals abused its discretion; (2) an epistemological
question—“[h]ow, in respect to matters involving the legal
impact of the Sultan report and deposition, can the Court
replace the panel’s judgment with its own”[;] and (3) a question
about basic jurisprudence—even though the “legal system is
based on rules; it also seeks justice in the individual case.”

Charles H. Whitebread (A.B., Princeton
University, 1965; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1968)
is the George T. and Harriet E. Pfleger Professor
of Law at the University of Southern California
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The Resource Page:
Focus on Electronic Discovery
Federal Judicial Center Resources
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/pages/196
The Federal Judicial Center has a web page devoted to
resources concerning the discovery of electronic information
(e.g., computer files, e-mail, hidden computer information,
etc.). Federal Judicial Center staff member Ken Withers, who
spoke at the AJA’s Anchorage conference, keeps an updated
and annotated summary of case law regarding electronic discovery on this page. In addition, you can review Power Point
presentations used to educate other judges about this subject,
proposed federal rules changes, relevant articles, forms orders,
and relevant state and local court rules.
The Sedona Conference
http://www.thesedonaconference.com
The Sedona Conference, a nonprofit research and education
institute, has organized a working group of attorneys, judges,
academics, and others to develop detailed guidelines regarding
electronic discovery. Their work has probably been the most
extensive in this area and an 82-page monograph providing
their principles applicable to electronic discovery and detailed
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help in applying them is available online. A detailed presentation on their work was made at the AJA’s Anchorage conference; attendees received a free copy of the 194-page annotated
version of these principles, which sells commercially for $129.
A limited number of additional copies of that book are available to AJA members. They can be ordered while supplies last
from the Association Management Division at the National
Center for State Courts, (757) 259-1841.
Conference of Chief Justices
Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding
Discovery of Electronically-Stored Information
h t t p : / / w w w. n c s c o n l i n e . o rg / W h a t ’s N e w / E - D i s c o v e r y
%20Guidelines.pdf
In September 2005, the Conference of Chief Justices released a
working draft of a set of guidelines for handling electronic discovery issues in state courts. Most of the guidelines are based
on case law or are similar to guidelines developed elsewhere,
including those of the Sedona Conference or the American Bar
Association. This CCJ endorsement, even in draft form, may
help to garner further use and support for the guidelines in
practice and in the courts.
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The Resource Page
d
NEW PUBLICATIONS

SPEAK TO AMERICAN VALUES: A HANDBOOK
WINNING THE DEBATE FOR FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL COURTS (2006). 22 pp.
http://www.justiceatstake.org

FOR

By now, we all know that the messages
of politicians and political parties are
carefully crafted and honed based on
focus-group sessions and opinion polls.
Messages have become coordinated and
sophisticated—including ones being
used to gain supp o rt for various
causes at the
expense of public
s u p p o rt for the
court system.
Justice
at
Stake, a nonpartisan national partnership of groups
s u p p o rting fair
and impartial courts, has taken on the
valuable task of developing similar
research and message development in
support of the court system and its values. Their work product has been condensed into a 22-page monograph available on the web. It is a “must read” for
judges at all levels.
Justice at Stake hired the Beldon
Russonello & Stewart firm to conduct
focus-group research and a July 2005
national survey. John Russonello was
one of the key speakers at the American
Judges Association’s National Forum on
Judicial Independence and wrote a 2004
Court Review article that serves as a precursor to this report: “Speak to Values:
How to Promote the Courts and Blunt
Attacks on the Judiciary,” available at
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/
cr41-2/CR41-2Russonello.pdf. The 2005
survey is summarized in this monograph. It showed that the public has a
strong belief in the courts’ role in protecting individual rights by upholding
the Constitution and a strong desire for
fair and impartial courts that are free
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from political influence or pressure once
judges take the bench.
Based on this research—and the
admonition contained in the prior Court
Review article to speak directly to these
core values represented by the courts—
Justice at Stake has developed detailed
suggestions for tailoring effective messages. For example, they urge arguments for “fair and impartial courts”
rather than the more theoretical call for
“judicial independence.”
They suggest emphasis on how
courts uphold the Constitution and protect everyone’s rights: the Beldon
Russonello survey showed that the two
most important qualities the public
wants in its court system were being
guardians of constitutional rights (33%)
and being fair and impartial (31%). A
bipartisan majority of Americans supports the court’s role in protecting individual rights and providing access to
justice: 84% strongly agreed that “we
need strong courts that are free from
political influence.” And just as Roger
Warren suggests in his article in this
issue of Court Review (see page 4),
Justice at Stake urges that courts and
judges embrace the concept of accountability. Included are key talking points,
model op-ed pieces, and sample letters
to the editor.
The American Judges Association has
joined the list of Justice at Stake partners. We encourage you to read this
monograph. If you have thoughts about
it, share them in a letter to the editor of
Court Review.

o

sures. These are based on—but are
intended to improve upon—the Trial
Court Performance Standards issued in
1990. (For a review of those standards,
take a look at Pamela Casey’s 1998 Court
Review article, “Defining Optimal Court
P e rf o rmance:
The
Trial
Court
P e rf o rmance Standards,” available at
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/
cr35-4/CR35-4Casey.pdf.)
Many courts adopted the Trial Court
Performance Standards and used periodic measurement under them to justify
funding requests to local-government
bodies with responsibility for court
funding. The new CourTools have taken
many of the Trial Court Performance
Standards and have integrated them
with successful perf o rmance-measurement systems used in both the public
and private sectors. And while the Trial
C o u rt Performance Standards were
accompanied by comprehensive, but
daunting, materials that could be used
in applying them to individual courts or
c o u rt systems, CourTools have been
designed for ease of understanding and
measurement.
CourTools allow for performance
measurement in 10 key areas: access
and fairness, clearance rates, time to disposition, age of active caseload, trialdate certainty, reliability and integrity of
case files, collection of monetary penalties, effective use of jurors, court workf o rce strength, and cost per case.
CourTools can be downloaded at the
website noted above. In addition,
printed copies can be obtained from the
National Center for State Courts.
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USEFUL INTERNET SITES

“CourTools” for Measuring
Trial-Court Performance
http://courtools.org
The National Center for State courts has
released a set of trial-court performancemeasurement tools called CourTools, a
set of 10 trial-court performance mea-

FOCUS ON
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY

An extensive program on electronic discovery in litigation was presented at the
2005 American Judges Association
annual
educational
conference.
Highlights of the resources noted there
are found at page 40.

